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Purpose Statement 
This publication is by and largely for the academic communities of the twenty-eight colleges and universities of the Evangelical 
Lutheran Church in America. It is published by the Division for Higher Education and Schools of the ELCA. The publication 
.presently has its home at Capital University, Columbus, Ohio which has generously offered leadership, physical and :financial 
support as an institutional sponsor for the inauguration of the publication. 
What is the purpose of such a publication? 
The ELCA has frequently sponsored conferences for faculty and administrators which have addressed the church 
college/university partnership. Recently the ELCA has sponsored an annual Vocation of the Lutheran College conference. The 
primary purpose of INTERSECTIONS is to enhance and continue such dialogue. It will do so by: 
* Lifting up the vocation of Lutheran colleges and universities
* Encouraging thoughtful dialogue about the partnership of colleges and universities with the church
* Offering a forum for concerns and interests of faculty at the intersection of faith, learning and teaching
* Raising for debate issues about institutional missions, goals, objectives and learning priorities
* Encouraging critical and productive discussion on our campuses of issues focal to the life of the church
* Serving as a bulletin board for communications among institutions and faculties
* Publishing papers presented at conferences sponsored by the ELCA and its institutions
* Raising the level of awareness among faculty about the Lutheran heritage and connectedness of their institutions,
realizing a sense of being part of a larger family with common interests and concerns.
From the Editor 
Jim Unglaube, who has served the ELCA's Division for Higher Education and Schools (and before that in the same office of 
· the ALC) has made a career move. Beginning the first of January he has begun his duties at Carthage College, his alma mater.
Jim has been the coordinator of the three previous Vocation of a Lutheran College Conferences, and has served as the Publisher
ofINTERSECTIONS. Both of these things he has worked diligently at, planning, enabling, and finding funding for them as they
have developed. In both projects he has obviously been concerned to initiate and continue a significant dialogue about the
meaning and possibilities of Lutheran higher education in the ELCA. He has done all this in his own quiet, modest, and efficient
way. We all, whether we are directly aware of our connection to him or not, owe him a debt of gratitude. Let me personally say
that it has been a pleasure to work with him and learn from him. Thank you Jim! Our best wishes to you on your new endeavors.
In previous issues of INTERSECTIONS I have used my editorial space to recommend some reading to you. I'm doing the same 
again. The book is Keeping Faith: Embracing the Tensions in Christian Higher Education, edited by Ronald A. Wells and 
published by Eerdmans. I recommend this book not only because of the interesting essays it contains but because of the kind of 
model it represents. It is a series of essays written and collected on the occasion of the installation of Gaylen Byker as the new 
president of Calvin College. What a great thing for a college to do; to collect the thoughts of significant people who have 
connection with the institution to reflect about the meaning of its mission and education there. We should do something like this 
in our ELCA institutions. 
This issue of INTERSECTIONS includes several provocative pieces. Richard Hughes has revised and expanded the text of his 
address to last summer's Vocation ofa Lutheran College Conference for inclusion here. We include some selections from a 
serious, yet ironic treatment of theological topics in dictionary form written by Carl Skrade and Spencer Porter. Gregory Clark 
has written a challenging essay about themes of peace and violence embedded in the rhetoric that shapes education. His essay is 
included here with a question-raising response by Karla Bohmbach. 
This issue of INTERSECTIONS also initiates some new features which we hope will continue: What I Have Learned - an 
essay by one of our senior or emeritus faculty reflecting on their long experience as scholars and teachers in our institutions, 
initiated by Richard Ylvisaker; Reviews, - where recent books, the arts, films, and other media presentations can be reviewed by 
our readers, initiated with a review by Karla Bohmbach; Bulletin Board - where news of programs that may be of interest to 
faculty/administration at all our institutions may be listed. Please feel free to submit material or suggestions for all three of these 




THE VOCATION OF A LUfflERAN COLLEGE: 
SOME TRANSITIONAL THOUGHTS 
I come to you with some final reflections on 30 years in Lutheran higher education. I do this even as I begin a new chapter in my own 
journey at Carthage College, my own Alma Mater. Leaving the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America's Division for Higher 
Education and Schools has not been easy. The Vocation of a Lutheran College project is a good example of what made that a difficult 
decision. We have been called as colleges and universities of the church to be places where mind, body and spirit are nurtured; to be 
places of both high quality and of excellence in all that we do. We have been called to be places which help students come to an 
understanding of their own vocation and then to take ownership of it. The results of our efforts are best told through the stories of 
our students, where and how they live out their own vocation as global citizens in service to the church and to the larger society. You 
all know those stories and we all need to keep telling them. 
I look back now on my own good fortune. I began to explore my own vocation as a student at Carthage College. I began to live it out 
as a faculty member in chemistry at Lenoir-Rhyne College. I thought I would spend my life there doing that. I didn't. I took a turn 
into academic administration, also at Lenoir-Rhyne. And then, an opportunity came along to be a part of nurturing the church's 
mission in higher education, an opportunity which lasted twenty years. I made an apprehensive entry into this role, grew through the 
support and encouragement of countless people, and, now as I look back,· had an almost unbelievable experience. I will not forget 
the importance of my colleague, Richard Solberg, in the early days of that work. My life became intertwined with the lives of 29 
colleges and universities and of thousands of people. 
I had the good fortune of watching these institutions thrive and grow in strength and stature. I watched as we made our way through 
the period of population decline of traditional college-age students. We came through that period, by and large, remarkable well. We 
grew slowly but steadily in enrollment through that period. We were fortunate to enter the new period of financial challenge in our 
lives, in the midst of which we now live, in rather good shape. Our endowments, while still not large enough, have grown from $70 
million to $1 billion in 25 years. Our students benefit from $500 million a year in financial aid. They also benefit from faculties as 
strong as they have ever been. It has not all been easy. I was directly involved in the decisions leading to the closing of Upsalsa 
College in 1995. That was a sad day. While the closing was, perhaps, inevitable, Upsala was serving a very diverse student body. It 
was living out an important vocation while struggling for its life. I along with my colleague Naomi Linnell, had the wonderful 
opportunity to live out the Higher Education and Namibia program. You on the campuses made the dream Naomi and I had come 
true. As a group we played, in fact we continue to play an important role in the development of the new nation of Namibia, now 
almost eight years old. This program too was a measure of our vocation as institutions in the Lutheran tradition. 
And then, I was gifted to travel all over the world. I still pinch myself to be sure it's true the places I've been on behalf of our work 
together. I never expected this to be a part of my work. Now my challenge is to touch the two remaining continents I have not visited; 
Australia and Antarctica. The latter, at least, will be hard to justify on behalf of Lutheran higher education or Carthage College. 
Perhaps an alumni tour. Perhaps the annual Vocation of a Lutheran College conference. At least air conditioning would not be a 
problem. 
I look back as well on our Vocation of a Lutheran College project. It has thrived and it has meant a great deal to me personally. I 
continue to thank Paul Dovre, President of Concordia College, for coming to us with the idea. It has benefited now from more than 
$200,000 in grant support. It must continue. It was put in place to help all of us come to a better understanding of what it means to 
be an institution of higher education in the Lutheran tradition. We live in a time of challenges to that tradition, from within the 
church and from the larger society. We hope that this project can help maintain and develop the strength of the partnership between 
church and college in the Lutheran tradition. I hope I can get to the conferences in the future. 
The colleges and universities of the Lutheran church are occasionally referred to as jewels. I agree with that characterization but I 
have another. I like to think of them as beautiful flowers, let's say roses. All of the flowers on a bush are the same color; the Lutheran 
tradition in higher education. At the same time each blossom is a little different from the next; the colleges and universities while 
all being a part of that tradition have their own histories and cultures. They live out their vocation in their own way. And, the rose 
bush will only thrive if it is cared for by the gardener. The same with the partnership between church and college. The partnership 
will only survive and thrive if it is nurtured. Let us never forget to water the flower, to trim them when they need it, to treasure their 
fragrance, and to share all that they are with each other. 
Thanks for the ride! 
James M. Unglaube 
Associate Vice President for Advancement and Senior Planned Giving Officer 
Carthage College 
Kenosha, Wisconsin 
OUR PLACE IN CHURCH-RELATED HIGHER EDUCATION 
IN THE UNITED ST A TES 
Richard T. Hughes 
What special niche do Lutheran colleges and universities 
occupy in the world of church-related higher education in the 
United States? I want to address this question with reference 
to the primary task of higher education, namely, our 
obligation to enhance the life of the mind. When we ask, 
then, about the special niche Lutheran colleges and 
universities occupy in the world of church-related higher 
education, we are really asking, "What unique theological 
resources do Lutherans bring to the task of higher education, 
and how can those resources sustain the life of the mind?" 
Before we begin, we must be clear on what we mean by the 
phrase, "the life of the mind." Surely, the life of the mind 
has little to do with rote memorization or the manipulation 
of data. Instead, it has everything to do with three 
dimensions of human thought. First, the life of the mind 
commits us to a rigorous and disciplined search for truth. 
Second, in the context of that search, the life of the mind 
entails genuine conversation as we seriously engage a 
variety of perspectives and worldviews in our radically 
pluralistic world. And third, the life of the mind involves 
critical thinking as we seek to discriminate between those 
worldviews and perspectives. When we ask, therefore, how 
the Lutheran heritage can sustain the life of the mind, we are 
asking how the Lutheran heritage can sustain the twin tasks 
of conversation and critical analysis in the context of the 
search for truth. 
My Introduction to the Lutheran Faith
Before getting into the substance of my remarks, I want to 
make a few autobiographical observations. In the first 
place, I am not Lutheran in a formal sense, but I am 
profoundly Lutheran in a spiritual sense. 
I grew up in a religious heritage that, at least in the days of 
my youth, was fraught with legalism and biblicism. As a 
result, I had little or no sense of biblical themes like 
"justification by grace through faith" until I was perhaps 20 
years old. A single incident will illustrate this point. 
Richard T. Hughes is Distinguished Professor of Religion at 
Pepperdine Univ., and co-editor (along with William B. 
Adrian) of Models for Christian Higher Education: 
Strategies for Success in The Twentieth Century. 
When I was in the fifth grade, growing up in San Angelo, 
Texas, I always walked to school and had to cross a very 
busy street before I reached my final destination. I vividly 
recall reminding myself on many occasions that if per chance 
I were struck by a car and killed on the way to school, I 
must remember to ask God for forgiveness for all the sins I 
had committed since my most recent prayers. Ifl managed 
to get that prayer in before I expired, I had a chance at going 
to heaven. If not, I would be doomed to eternal damnation. 
You might think this a morbid thought for a ten-year old kid, 
but that's the way it was in my world in those years. 
I don't recall hearing the gospel of God's grace until I was 
a sophomore in a church-related college. In a course on the 
book of Romans, the professor came to Romans 8: l: "For 
there is therefore now no condemnation to those who are in 
Christ Jesus." He explained to us that this text meant 
precisely what it said-that those of us who were in Christ 
Jesus had been liberated by the grace of God from the 
obligation to achieve perfection. I was flabbergasted, but 
also immensely relieved. 
Some four years later, I encountered again the message of 
God's grace in an extraordinarily powerful way. Once 
again, the encounter occurred in a university classroom. 
This time, however, the setting was not a church college but 
a state university-the University of Iowa where I was 
working on my doctorate in the field of religion. And the 
class was not on Romans, but on Martin Luther. The 
Professor was George Porell. I shall never forget the day 
when Porell explained Luther's concept of simul ;ustus et 
peccator (simultaneously justified and a sinner) - a far cry 
from my earlier childhood understanding that I would have 
to utter a prayer of contrition before I could possibly be 
accepted by Almighty God. The truth is, I found Luther 
incredibly liberating, so much so that Luther's theology of 
justification by grace through faith has formed the bedrock 
of my spiritual orientation from that day to this. 
And so I speak in this essay not as a Lutheran in a formal, 
confessional sense, but as a Lutheran in terms of my own 
spiritual commitments, at least in certain fundamental 
respects. I also speak as a university professor deeply 
concerned for the integrity of the academic enterprise. This 
means that I have asked myself countless times over the past 
twenty-five years, "How can the Lutheran worldview sustain 
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the life of the mind?" I hope in this paper to share some 
perspectives on that question. 
Some Comparisons 
We will grasp those perspectives far better if we begin by 
comparing the Lutheran heritage with three other Christian 
traditions. I want to ask first about the theological resources 
the Reformed tradition brings to the task of higher education, 
and how that tradition is equipped to sustain the life of the 
mind. I want to begin with the Reformed model since that 
model is so widely known and embraced in many Protestant 
circles of church-related higher education. Then, I want to 
ask the very same questions regarding Mennonites, on the 
one hand, and Roman Catholics, on the other. Once we ask 
and answer these questions, we will be in a good position to 
ask about the special niche Lutheran colleges and 
universities occupy in the world of church-related higher 
education in the United States. 
A Reformed Model 
If we ask how the Reformed tradition can sustain the life of 
the mind, the answer has everything to do with the original 
vision of John Calvin. Simply put, Calvin sought to 
transform Geneva, Switzerland into a model kingdom of 
God. To achieve this goal, he sought to place every facet of 
Genevan life-its religion, its politics, its music and its 
art-squarely under the sovereignty of God. Ever since those 
early days, this same vision has motivated Calvinists to 
bring all human life and culture under the sovereign sway of 
God's control. Abraham Kuyper, the Dutch statesman and 
philosopher, expressed this vision well: "There is not a 
square inch on the whole plain of human existence over 
which Christ, who is Lord over all, does not proclaim: 'This 
is Mine1"' 1 
Clearly, the passion to transform human culture into the 
Kingdom of God is the driving genius of the Reformed 
tradition, and it is precisely this vision that sustains the life 
of the mind in many Reformed institutions of higher 
learning. Reformed educators seek to place the entire 
curriculum-and every course within the curriculum-under the 
sovereignty of God. According to this vision, all learning 
should be Christian in both purpose and orientation. For this 
reason, Reformed educators employ three fundamental 
concepts that underscore these objectives. 
The first and most important of those concepts is a notion 
popularized by Abraham Kuyper, the notion of a Christian 
worldview. As Albert Wolters points out, Kuyper argued 
that "Calvinism was not just a theology or a system of 
ecclesiastical polity but a complete worldview with 
implications for all of life, implications which must be 
worked out and applied in such areas as politics, art, and 
scholarship." With such a worldview, Kuyper believed, 
Christianity could provide broad cultural leadership in the 
nineteenth century and compete head to head with other 
perspectives like socialism or Darwinism or positivism.2 
Central to. the notion of a Christian world view stands the 
second conviction, the notion that all truth is God's truth. 
By this phrase, Reformed educators mean to say that God is 
the author not only of our faith, but also of every facet of the 
world in which we live. If this is true, then there can be no 
discrepancy between Christian convictions and authentic 
knowledge regarding other aspects of human life. It is 
therefore possible to understand every facet of the natural 
sciences, of the social sciences, and of religion and the 
humanities in the light of Christian faith without running the 
risk of intellectual dishonesty. 
It is precisely this conviction that breathes life into the third 
concept employed by Reformed educators: the integration 
of faith and learning. Because all truth is God's truth, all 
learning should be integrated into a coherent understanding 
ofreality, informed by explicitly Christian convictions. No 
one has expressed the theological rationale for this 
perspective better than Arthur Holmes in his classic book, 
The Idea of a Christian College. There Holmes argues: 
When the apostle writes that in Christ "are hid all the 
treasures of wisdom and knowledge" (Col. 2:3), he refers 
... to [the fact that] Jesus Christ is ..  Creator and Lord 
of every created thing. All our knowledge of anything 
comes into focus around that fact. We see nature. persons, 
society, and the arts and sciences in proper relationship to 
their divine Creator and Lord. . . . The truth is a coherent 
whole by virtue of the common focus that ties it all into 
one. 3 
It is incumbent, therefore, upon Reformed educators to 
integrate explicitly Christian convictions into every branch 
of learning and, more than that, to discover those common, 
Christocentric threads that transform all fields of learning 
into one coherent whole. 
Finally, this triad of ideas - a Christian worldview, all truth 
is God's truth, and the integration of faith and learning -
this triad of ideas sustains another notion that is critical to at 
least one version of the Reformed understanding of reality: 
the notion of secularization. The truth is, one finds in the 
Reformed tradition two perspectives on this theme. First, 
Calvin himself argued that "the Spirit of God [is] the sole 
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fountain of truth," whether one finds that truth in the secular 
sphere or in divine revelation.4 At the same time, following 
another impulse in Calvin, many contemporary Reformed 
thinkers view the secular as a hindrance to the Christian 
presence in the world and therefore seek to overcome it by 
transforming it into the Kingdom of God. 5 
From this latter perspective, secularization occurs when 
there is even one dimension of human life that escapes the 
sovereignty of God, or when we fail to bring all of reality 
under the umbrella of a distinctly Christian worldview. 
Because the possibility of secularization is so real in this 
context, the notion of a slippery slope is a metaphor that 
many in this tradition take very seriously. This means that 
if one hopes to avoid the slippery slope toward 
secularization, the integration of faith and learning around a 
distinctly Christian worldview. becomes absolutely 
imperative. 
This consideration will become important when we compare 
the Reformed tradition with Lutheranism, on the one hand, 
and Catholicism, on the other. For if some in the Reformed 
tradition argue that the slippery slope to secularization is a 
real and present danger, both the Lutheran and Catholic 
traditions acknowledge the secular as a legitimate vehicle of 
the grace of God. 
Now we must finally ask, "How can the Reformed tradition 
sustain the life of the mind?" Clearly, it does so by 
integrating faith and learning around a distinctly Christian 
worldview. One can identify at least two great strengths of 
this perspective, whether one subscribes to the Reformed 
worldview or not. In the first place, it overcomes 
fragmentation with its wholistic approach to learning. And 
in the second place, it provides students with a clearly 
defined standpoint from which they can discriminate between 
competing perspectives and worldviews. And if one cares 
about relating faith to learning at all, one is likely to find the 
Reformed emphasis on the sovereignty of God over the entire 
learning process extraordinarily compelling. 
But to what extent does the Reformed perspective encourage 
academic freedom and genuine interaction with pluralism 
and diversity? There are two answers to that question. 
First, if a given scholar embraces the Reformed worldview, 
and is willing to understand all reality from the standpoint of 
that perspective, she or he will experience substantial 
academic freedom. Arthur Holmes, among others, has made 
this point abundantly clear. 
Academic freedom is valuable only when there is a prior 
commitment to the truth. And commitment to the truth is 
fully worthwhile only when that truth exists in One who 
transcends both the relativity of human perspectives and 
the fears of human concern. 6 
On the other hand, while the Reformed perspective allows 
the scholar substantial freedom to search for penultimate 
truths within the context of an all-embracing Christian 
worldview, the Reformed perspective is always susceptible 
to the twin risks of triumphalism and distortion. A 
hypothetical case in point might be a class in world religions. 
How, for example, would one study Buddhism from the 
standpoint of a Christian worldview without either distorting 
Buddhism into something it is not or debunking Buddhism in 
favor of a triumphalist Christian perspective? 
And yet, the Reformed tradition contains at its core a 
powerful sentiment that can undermine triumphalism. That 
sentiment is simply the historic Reformed insistence on the 
finitude of humankind and of all human thinking and 
constructions. Arthur Holmes points squarely to that 
conviction when he writes, "Truth is not yet fully known; 
every academic discipline is subject to change, correction, 
and expansion-even theology." Holmes further notes that 
even worldview construction must take on tentative 
dimensions. A Christian worldview, he argues, is merely 
"exploratory, not a closed system worked out once and for 
all but an endless undertaking. . . . It remains open-ended 
because the task is so vast that to complete it would require 
the omniscience of God. "7 
And yet, the notion that God has called upon His saints to 
renovate the world is such an overpowering theme in the 
Reformed tradition that the profoundly Calvinist theme of 
human finitude and brokenness sometimes gets lost in the 
shuffle. 
A Mennonite Model
When we tum from the Reformed to the 
Anabaptist/Mennonite tradition, we quickly discover that we 
have entered into a frame of reference radically different 
from the Reformed perspective. The first thing we notice is 
that the starting point for Mennonites has more to do with 
wholistic living than with cognition, more to do with ethics 
than with intellect. One faculty member at Goshen College 
summarized very nicely the difference between the Reformed 
and Mennonite models when she observed that if the 
Reformed model is fundamentally cerebral and transforms 




More precisely, Mennonites begin their task by seeking to 
implement a vision of discipleship that takes its cue from the 
radical teachings of Jesus. They take seriously Jesus' words 
when he counseled his followers to abandon self in the 
interest of others, or when he charged his disciples to 
practice humility, simplicity, and non-violence. Their's is a 
radical vision, to be sure, and one that stands almost entirely 
out of synch with the values of the larger culture. 
One who is unaccustomed to the Mennonite frame of 
reference might well ask what this perspective has to do with 
the life of the mind. How can unconventional virtues like 
these possibly sustain the values we associate with the 
academy? Put another way, how does one move from 
Christocentric living to critical and pluralistic thinking? 
We can answer that question in three ways. First, we must 
recall that sixteenth-century Anabaptism originated in the 
very womb of dissent. In a world that prized lockstep 
uniformity, Anabaptists dared to question the status quo. It 
matters little that their dissent began with lifestyle 
commitments, not with high-level theoretical formulations. 
Regardless of their starting point, sixteenth-century 
Anabaptists proved time and again their commitment to 
independent thinking. If a willingness to question 
conventional wisdom stands at the heart of the academic 
enterprise, then surely the Anabaptist heritage offers 
important resources for sustaining the life of the mind. 
Second, Mennonites routinely counsel one another to 
abandon self in the interest of others and to abandon narrow 
nationalism in the interest of world citizenship. For this 
reason, service to other human beings, especially to the poor, 
the marginalized, and the oppressed throughout the world, 
stands at the heart of the Mennonite witness. If we ask how 
a global service commitment like this can sustain the life of 
the mind, the answer is not hard to find. It is difficult to 
abandon self for the sake of others in any meaningful sense 
unless one is prepared to take seriously those "others," their 
cultural contexts, and their points of view. This means that 
Mennonite colleges, precisely because of their service 
orientation, are prepared to take seriously one of the cardinal 
virtues of the modern academy: the emphasis on pluralism 
and diversity. 
If one wishes to see how this commitment might play itself 
out in an academic context, one need only consider the 
international studies program at Goshen College where 
eighty percent of all students spend one entire semester in a 
third world culture where they serve, on the one hand, and 
seek to learn that country's history, cultural traditions, and 
language, on the other. 
Finally, because of its historic emphasis on humility, the 
Mennonite tradition prepares its scholars to embrace one of 
the cardinal virtues of the academic guild: the willingness to 
admit that my understandings may be fragmentary and 
incomplete and that, indeed, I could be wrong. 
For all these reasons, the Mennonite commitment to a life of 
radical discipleship can contribute in substantial ways to a 
vigorous life of the mind. Yet, we must also acknowledge 
that while the Mennonite commitment to stand with a radical 
Jesus is surely one of their greatest strengths, it can also be 
a serious liability in the arena of higher education. 
Ironically, the very commitment that has often inspired 
humility, dissent, and respect for cultural diversity can also 
inspire narrowness and sectarian exclusivity. This can 
happen in several ways, when Mennonites, for example, 
allow the radical teachings of Jesus to become little more 
than the substance of ethnic folkways, or when Mennonites 
take seriously the ethical mandates of Jesus without 
embracing with equal seriousness the grace of God whereby 
He forgives us in spite of our failings and shortcomings. 
A Roman Catholic Model 
When we ask about a Roman Catholic model for higher 
education, the first thing we notice is the diversity that 
characterizes Catholic institutions of higher learning. After 
all, Catholic colleges and universities were established not 
by the church per se but by a variety of religious orders that 
bring to the task of higher education a diversity of emphases. 
Nonetheless, we find in all Catholic colleges and universities 
certain uniquely Catholic dimensions that sustain the life of 
the mind. 
The first of these dimensions is the sacramental principle 
which points to the fact that the natural world and even 
elements of human culture can serve as vehicles by which the 
grace of God is mediated to human beings. This conviction 
allows Catholic educators to take the world seriously on its 
own terms and to interact with the world as it is. 
If some Reformed educators argue that the world and the 
contents of human culture are fundamentally secular if not 
brought under the sovereign sway of the Lord Jesus Christ, 
many Catholic educators, affirming the sacramental 
principle, take sharp issue with that contention. Alice 
Gallin, former executive director of the Association for 
Catholic Colleges and Universities, for example, has argued 
that '"secular' is not simply nor always the opposite of 
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'sacred,' for in a Christian sacramental view of reality, the 
secular has a legitimate role and one that is congruent with 
and not opposed to faith or religion. "8 
This is why David O'Brien of the College of the Holy Cross 
points to one of the documents of Vatican II, The Pastoral 
Constitution on the Church and the Modern World, as a 
virtual '"magna charta" for Catholic colleges and 
universities. It functions in this way, O'Brien argued, since 
it affirms "the study of the human sciences, respect for non­
Catholic, secular culture, dialogue with those beyond the 
church, and service to society," all in the context of the 
sacramental principle.9 Two other Catholic 
educators-Emmanuel Renner and Hilary Thimmesh, 
writing in Models for Christian Higher Education-argue 
that "secularization could very well mean sacramentalization 
to those who recognized the presence of God in the world." 10 
In a word, the sacramental principle sustains the life of the 
mind by placing a very great value both on the natural world 
and on human culture, and by reminding us that these realms 
are fully legitimate, whether transformed by the· rule of 
Christ or not. For this reason, the notion of a slippery slope 
to secularization scarcely makes sense in a Roman Catholic 
context. 
The second characteristic that allows the Catholic tradition 
to sustain the life of the mind is the universality of the 
Catholic faith. As a global church, Catholicism embraces 
believers from every comer of the world, people who hold a 
variety of political ideologies, who speak a myriad of 
tongues, who represent virtually every nationality in the 
world, and who reflect every social and economic class on 
the planet today. Not only is Catholicism universal in this 
very tangible sense; it is also intentionally universal from a 
theological point of view. 
The universality of the Catholic tradition should permit the 
Catholic university to prize pluralism and diversity and to 
find a legitimate place at the table for every conversation 
partner. Many have argued this case, but no one has done 
so more effectively than Fr. Theodore Hesburgh, President 
Emeritus of the University of Notre Dame. "The Catholic 
university," Hesburgh writes: 
must be a bridge across all the chasms that separate 
modern people from each other: the gaps between young 
and old, men and women, rich and poor, black and white, 
believer and unbeliever, potent and weak, east and west, 
material and spiritual, scientist and humanist, developed 
and less developed, and all the rest. To be such a 
mediator, the Catholic university, as universal, must be 
engaged with, and have an interest in, both edges of every 
gulf must understand each, encompass each in its total 
community and build a bridge of understanding and love. 11 
This notion of the Catholic university as bridge, rooted in 
the universality of the Catholic faith, can play itself out in 
some very concrete ways, most notably in faculty hiring 
policies. On the one hand, Notre Dame has sought to create 
that bridge by hiring not only a diversity of faculty from a 
variety of faith traditions and no tradition at all, but also by 
insuring "'the continuing presence of a predominant number 
of Catholic intellectuals"' on the faculty, as the university's 
president mandated in 1993. 12 On the other hand, many
Catholic institutions, grounding themselves in that same 
concern for universality, demonstrate little or no concern 
with this issue. David O'Brien reports, for example, that "a 
Jesuit dean [ at Georgetown] told the faculty that, while 
wisdom rooted in faith remained central at Georgetown, 'a 
person's religion plays no part in hiring, tenure, promotion, 
the awarding of grants or the securing of funds. In fact, 
most of us don't know each other's religious beliefs.'" 13 
The final Catholic commitment I wish to consider is one 
Monika Hellwig describes as the communitarian nature of 
redemption. At its core, this notion holds that the church is 
not simply the hierarchical magisterium; instead, the church 
is comprised of all the people of God, scattered throughout 
the world, who together form this community of faith. This 
means that the life of the mind, if understood only in 
cognitive terms, is less than adequate in a Catholic 
university. Instead, as Hellwig notes, the life of the mind 
must translate itself into 
genuine bonds of friendship and mutual respect and 
support [which] are envisaged as the core of the 
educational enterprise, because not only book learning but 
human formation for leadership and responsibility in all 
walks of life are sought through the community experience 
of higher education. 14 
Precisely because it takes "seriously the unity of the human 
race," the communitarian dimension suggests that Catholic 
colleges and universities should place scholarship and 
teaching in the service of justice and peace for all the peoples 
of the world. To a great extent, Catholic institutions-and 
especially Jesuit institutions-have done just that. As David 
O'Brien observes, "president after president [in the world of 
Catholic higher education] has repeated the words of the 
American bishops insisting that pursuit of justice and human 
dignity is an essential work of a Catholic institution. " 15 
It is clear that the Roman Catholic tradition is at home with 
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human reason, with the natural world, with secular human 
culture, with human history, with human beings who stand 
both inside and outside of the Catholic faith, and with human 
beings in every conceivable social circumstance. It is 
precisely this dimension that renders the Catholic faith, at 
least in theory, so compatible with the ideals of the modem 
university. 
At the same time, it is entirely possible for the Catholic 
tradition to stand at odds with the life of the mind. This can 
happen when dogma displaces inquiry, when orthodoxy 
undermines the search for truth, or when Catholics 
absolutize those dimensions of Catholic faith that might 
otherwise have the potential to break through their own 
particularity. 
A Lutheran Model 
Finally, we must ask, "What resources does the Lutheran 
tradition offer for sustaining the life of the mind?" 
The first resource is Luther's insistence on human finitude 
and the sovereignty of God. To speak of human finitude is 
to point not only to our frailties, our limitations, and our 
estrangement from God, from other human beings, and from 
ourselves; it also points to the depth and breadth of sin that 
renders us incapable of knowing or doing the good. When 
Luther argues for God's sovereignty, therefore, his point is 
not that Christians should impose God's sovereignty on an 
unbelieving world. That would be an impossible absurdity. 
Rather, when Luther points to God's sovereignty, he always 
points at the very same time to human finitude. · The 
sovereignty of God, therefore, means that I am not God, that 
my reason is inevitably impaired, and that my knowledge is 
always fragmentary and incomplete. 
In the context of higher education and the life of the mind, 
this position means that every scholar must always confess 
that he or she could be wrong. Apart from this confession, 
there can be no serious life of the mind, for only when we 
confess that we might be wrong can we engage in the kind of 
conversation that takes seriously other voices. Further, it is 
only when we confess that we might be wrong that we are 
empowered to critically scrutinize our own theories, our own 
judgments, and our own understandings. Put another way, 
in the Lutheran tradition, doubt is always the partner of 
faith. In his marvelous book, Exiles from Eden, Mark 
Schwehn quotes James Gustafson to the effect that "we 
believe what we question and question what we believe." 16 
Or, as the father of the boy with the evil spirit confessed to 
Jesus in Mark 9, "Lord, I believe; help thou mine unbelief." 
One who refuses to confess that he or she might be wrong 
has forfeited the ability to engage in critical scholarship and 
really has no legitimate place in the academy. 
Because of the Lutheran insistence on human finitude, 
Lutheran theology always has the capacity to break through 
its own particularity. Authentic Lutherans can never 
absolutize their own perspectives, even their theological 
perspectives. They must always be reassessing and 
rethinking, and they must always be in dialogue with 
themselves and with others. This is the genius of the 
Lutheran tradition, and this is the first reason why the 
Lutheran worldview can sustain the life of the mind. 
The second resource the Lutheran tradition offers for 
sustaining the life of the mind is Luther's notion of paradox, 
a theme that stands at the heart of Lutheran thought. As we 
know, Luther gloried in the notion of paradox: the King of 
the universe born in a manger, God Himself nailed to a 
Roman cross, the Christian who is both free and servant at 
one and the same time, or finally, the Christian who is 
simultaneously justified and a sinner. 
But of all these Lutheran paradoxes, there is none more 
supportive of the life of the mind than Luther's notion of the 
two kingdoms. In his view, the Christian lives in the world 
and in the Kingdom of God - or, put another way, in nature 
and in grace-and does so simultaneously. In fact, in 
Luther's vision, God employs the finite dimensions of the 
natural world as vehicles which convey his grace to human 
beings. As Luther often affinned,finitum capax in.finiti or, 
the finite is the bearer of the infinite. At this point, the 
Lutheran tradition greatly resembles Catholic sacramental 
understandings. 
The authentic Lutheran vision, therefore, never calls for 
Lutherans to transform the secular world into the Kingdom 
of God as many in the Reformed tradition have advocated 
over the years. Nor does it call for Lutherans to separate 
from the world as the heirs of the Anabaptists sometimes 
seek to do. Instead, the Christian must reside in two worlds 
at one and the same time: the world of nature and the world 
of grace. The Christian in Luther's view, therefore, is free 
to take seriously both the secular world and the Kingdom of 
God. 
This notion carries great implications for the life of the mind, 
especially if we think of the life of the mind as one which 
fosters genuine conversation in which all the voices at the 
table are taken seriously. Clearly, in the Lutheran context, 
there is a "Christian worldview." But in the light of 
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Luther's two kingdoms, there is no need to impose that 
worldview on other voices. Nor is it important to "integrate 
faith and learning" around that perspective. Rather, one 
seeks to bring the secular world and a Christian perspective 
into conversation with one another. Luther's notion of the 
two kingdoms is therefore fully capable of sustaining a 
commitment to the Christian faith and a serious engagement 
with the secular world at one and the same time. For this 
reason, the notion of a slippery slope to secularization makes 
no more sense in a Lutheran context than it does m a 
Catholic context, and for very similar reasons. 
While the Lutheran tradition possesses extraordinary 
resources for sustaining the.life of the mind, the strength of 
the Lutheran tradition is also its weakness. As we have 
seen, the notion of paradox is central to the Lutheran 
tradition, but it is all too easy to sacrifice one side of the 
paradox in the interest of the other. When the paradox 
dissolves in this way, the risks can be absolutism on the one 
hand and relativism on the other. 
These temptations are especially apparent when one 
considers Luther's understanding of the two kingdoms. If 
we accentuate the Kingdom of God at the expense of the 
secular world, we run the risk of absolutizing our religious 
vision. Here one thinks, for example, of the scholastic 
theologians who absolutized the dynamic, paradoxical 
qualities of Luther's thought into a rigid, airtight system. It 
is safe to say that this version of Lutheran theology is simply 
inimical to the life of the mind. Yet, rigid codification of 
Lutheran thought occurs even within some Lutheran colleges 
and universities. 
On the other hand, if we accentuate the secular world at the 
expense of the Kingdom of God, we run the risk of 
relativism since we have diminished our transcendent point 
of reference. 
This means that if Lutheran colleges hope to draw on their 
Lutheran heritage to sustain the life of the mind, they must 
find some way to keep alive the heart and soul of Luther's 
original vision, namely, the paradox of the Gospel and the 
affirmation of the sovereignty of God and the finitude of 
humankind. 
Conclusion 
Finally, I want to make a few observations regarding the 
dilemmas Lutheran colleges and universities inevitably face 
as they seek to interpret the Lutheran vision to potential 
constituents. 
In the first place, because the Lutheran tradition thrives on 
paradox, ambiguity, thoughtfulness, and reflection, it is 
difficult to explain a Lutheran institution that genuinely lives 
out of the Lutheran worldview. As the director of 
development for one Lutheran institution told me a couple of 
years ago, "It's tough to market ambiguity." This is all the 
more true in a "sound bite" culture such as ours. How can 
one possibly explain a Lutheran institution to a potential 
student or a potential donor in a sound bite? 
While in one sense this may seem like a disadvantage for 
Lutheran institutions, in another sense this may well be a 
potential asset. Because Lutheran theological resources are 
unique in the world of church-related higher education, and 
because those resources can do so much to sustain the life of 
the mind, Lutheran colleges and universities have the 
potential to grow into absolutely first class institutions of 
higher learning. This means that while Lutheran educators 
may not be able to explain to potential donors or potential 
students all the intricacies of a Lutheran worldview, they can 
explain that Lutheran colleges and universities offer a first 
class education where the life of the mind is nurtured, where 
all questions are taken seriously, where critical thinking is 
encouraged, and where a diversity of cultures are valued; 
and that these virtues all grow from deep and profound 
commitment to the Christian faith. 
In my view, this is the niche-and it is a special niche 
indeed-that Lutheran colleges and universities occupy in 





1. Abraham Kuyper, "Souvereiniteit in Eigen Kring"
(Amsterdam: Kruyt, 1880), p. 32, cited in James D. Bratt
and Ronald A. Wells, "Piety and Progress: A History of
Calvin College" in Richard T. Hughes and William B.
Adrian, eds., Models for Christian Higher Education:
Strategies for Survival and Success in the Twentieth-First
Century (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), p. 143.
2. Albert Wolters, "On the Idea of Worldview and Its
Relation to Philosophy," in Paul A. Marshall, Sander
Griffioen, and Richard J. Mouw, eds., Stained Glass:
Worldviews and Social Science (New York: University
Press of America, 1989), p. 20.
3. Arthur Holmes, The Idea of a Christian College, rev. ed.
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987), p. 17.
4. John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, 2.2.15,
in John T. McNeill and Ford Lewis Battles, eds., The
Library of Christian Classics, vol. 20 (Philadelphia:
Westminster, 1960), pp. 273-75.
5. See Nicholas Wolterstorff's important discussion of the
role of the secular in Reformed thought in Until Justice and
Peace Embrace (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1983), pp. 12
and 40-41.
6. Holmes, The Idea of a Christian College, p. 69.
7. Holmes, The Idea of a Christian College, pp. 58-59 and
66.
8. Alice Gallin, "American Church Related Higher
Education: Comparison and Contrast," ACHE
presentation, December 29, 1992, p. 1.
9. David O'Brien, From the Heart of the American
Church: Catholic Higher Education and American
Culture (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1994), p. 49.
10. Emmanuel Renner and Hilary Thimmesh, "Faith and
Learning at the College of Saint Benedict and Saint John's
University" in Models, p. 37.
11. Theodore Hesburgh, "The Challenge and Promise of a
Catholic University" in Hesburgh, ed., The Challenge and
Promise of a Catholic University (Notre Dame, IN:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1994), pp. 9-11.
12. Cited in O'Brien, From the Heart of the American
Church, p. 91.
13. Renner and Thimmesh, "Faith and Learning" in Models,
pp. 42-43; and O'Brien, From the Heart of the American
Church, p. 90.
14. Hellwig, ''What Can the Roman Catholic Tradition
Contribute?" p. 21.
15. O'Brien, From the Heart of the American Church, pp.
86-87
16. Mark Schwehn, Exiles From Eden: Religion and the
Academic Vocation in America (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1993), p. 49.
Intersections/Winter 1998 
10 
7/i.e _faff(JU!fng are e;rcepts selected ftom a mucli fmger te;r,t,, presentlj; foo,t_ing /or a _pu!ifi4ier u;lio is Uli!!ing to foo,t_ at 
sometfmw tliat is fiotli 7ko/qJical and Ullitten Ulitli a sense q/liumor. !tfeaders interested in other entties sliouftf conpspomf Ultt!i 
!Prefessors S,t.mde am/ !Porter tliwugli Sqade in the !ZJepartment if !!(ff/!lio11y Capital 'llnit1ersit.!f. 
THE SKEPTICAL THEOLOGIAN'S DICTIONARY 
Spencer Porter and Carl Skrade 
A 
answer noun I. A response to a question or the solution to 
a problem. 2. In our times it has come to be assumed that 
questions are defined in terms of their answers, but in 
theology this is not so. In fact this disjunction is one cardinal 
reason that both theological language and poetry are seen as 
strange or even empty of content. We educate ourselves and 
each other to search for answers; and when we encounter a 
question which does not fit the mould, we have no idea of 
what to do next. 3. In theology and in poetry the answers are 
less important than the questions themselves, which are often 
answered again and again yet never answered. Thus Jesus 
asks Peter, "Who do you say that I am?" (Matthew 16: 15) 
The dialogue which ensues is important, and Peter's answers 
are interesting and informative; but the question stands on its 
own quite apart from what Peter said. It is a sign, and an 
unfortunate one at that, that the modem age has spilled tons 
of blood over differing interpretations of the answers while 
refusing to live in the mystery of the question. See problem 
and question. 
ark noun l. An especially unseaworthy boat built by Noah, 
who was not a seaman at all! (Genesis 9:20) For a time, it 
is said, this boat contained the whole of the human race and 
culture. God regretted ever having made this race, but for 
some reason, never truly explained, he relented and saved 
this small renmant. 2. The first of several demonstrations in 
the Bible that God makes very odd choices when calling 
people to vocations. It would seem that when it comes to 
reading resumes God is without a clue. 
3. The ark may also be seen as a metaphor for the church
and the graces which may be obtained by being within it:
much better than the alternative even if the stench is
ferocious!
Carl Skrade is Professor and Chair of the Dept. of Religion 
at Capital. Spencer Porter has taught chemistry at 
Concordia, Gustavus Adolphus, and Capital University 
( among others). He now is a research chemist for the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency. 
B 
belief noun 1. The act of thinking that some story or 
doctrine is true, based either on evidence accessible to all 
or on some special insight available to only a few. 2. 
While virtually no one wishes to believe either stories or 
doctrines that are false, it is odd that belief is seen to be a 
virtue. It is not, and elevating belief to a virtue generally 
results in idolatry. "To believe falsely" seems to be an 
oxymoron in all languages. 3. At its best belief is a bet 
which hope places against the boxing with reality which 
passes for thinking in most of the world. At its worst belief 
comes from the fear which causes the boxing. Most of us 
struggle with a mixture of the two, and the story of the man 
with the epileptic son (Mark 9: 17-24) brings this into focus. 
4. Those who would make belief itself into a virtue ought to
compare the demons who knew and believed without doubt
that Jesus was the Messiah (Mark 5:1-20 and many other
passages) to the apostles who were still m the dark at the end
of the story! (Mark 16: 11) 5. A common error is confusing
belief with faith (which see). This error is not innocent as
such belief shades into doctrine then dogma then rigid
orthodoxy then inquisition. Belief can and has become a
primary defense against newness, possibility, and freedom.
Such a defense has led in modem times to both violence and
depression, the twentieth century's diseases of choice. There
is little doubt that God prefers atheism to many of these
forms of belief. If this were not so, Jesus would not have
been as sharp with the demons as he always was. 6. It is
thought that it is differences in belief that divide the
churches, and theologians of all sorts claim to love the truth
and speak it and to hate error. It is not surprising in the least
that truth in one tradition will often coincide with error in
another. The real truth is that all of our dogmas are wrong
to some extent. A great scandal of the church is that
differences in belief - especially those that are difficult to
understand and explain - are used to divide the church. Since
the church is a human institution, these divisions must have
more to do with interests and property than with principles




:'.'.church noun 1. On a mystical level the Body of Christ and 
the company of all faithful people. 2. On the human level a 
temporary and contingent organization. It is a sign of grace 
and a sense of humor that God put up with it. The true 
church may be described by the acronym from computer 
science WYSIWYG (what you see is what you get). It is a 
community - often shapeless and goalless - of those who 
have been grasped by that awe-filled freedom for which 
Christ has set us free. (Galatians 5: 1) 3. It is both sanctuary 
and refuge, which entries see. At the church's best it is 
possible to meet within its body, aware that everyone in it is 
as much a sinner and is as much saved · and healed as 
everyone else. 4. Eventually the church will be out of 
business. There was no church in Eden (Genesis 2:15-25), 
and there will be none in the new heaven either (Revelation 
21:22). In the present time however, the church is an 
institution or collection of them, which own property, has 
laws and hierarchies, and quarrels with itself. Like all 
institutions it can not imagine the world without itself, and 
so it spends much of its energy perpetuating itself all the 
while vainly imagining that the reign of God depends on 
itself. It does not, and the Galilean carpenter whose name it 
takes had no interest in institutions of any kind - except to 
subvert those which held the people he loved in bondage. 
comedy noun 1. A dramatic form designed to entertain by 
calling on the lighter human emotions. As such, comedy may 
use wit, buffoonery, ridicule, and satire to amuse - and 
enlighten. Comedic stories have happy endings except for the 
villains and butts of the jokes. 2. What a Bob Hope one-liner 
is not, but what a Robin Williams one-liner is. 3. The 
human story spiraling upward towards its unfolding and 
fulfillment. 4. The 'yes' within the 'no,' the light within the 
dark, the joy within brokenness. 5. The suddenness and 
surprise of grace. 6. The holy joke which is sprung whenever 
one realizes that what is needed is already in hand. 7. The 
Bible contains a fair amount of comedy; and if pious folk did 
not read it all so grimly, the book would be enjoyed much 
more than it is. Examples are the story of Ruth, the story of 
Gideon (Judges 6-8), several of the parables of Jesus, and 
the Book of Revelation. See grace, parable, poetry and 
tragedy. 
F 
fence noun 1. A barrier designed to separate pieces of God's 
creation from his creatures. 2. The poet (R. Frost) said "that 
good fences make good neighbors," but he was being ironic, 
a fact missed by the majority of his readers. Fences offer the 
illusion of . safety as they can for a time effect real 
separation, but eventually what is being avoided will get in 
somehow. 3. Several centuries ago churches came _to have 
fences (known as altar or communion rails) inside to protect 
the altar and the priest from wandering farm animals. Soon 
the separation was between the clergy and the laity, and to 
some extent that division persists to this day. To be sure, 
certain members of the laity have been able to enter the area 
inside, known as the chancel, but only under carefully 
prescribed conditions. 5. At the time of the Reformation 
most Protestant church leaders saw that the division was 
artificial or worse, and the rails came down in most places. 
Even in England the Archbishop of Canterbury, Thomas 
Cranmer, decreed that the faithful surround the communion 
table. This never caught on; Cranmer was burned at the 
stake in 1555; and fences persist in Anglican churches to this 
day. During the l 960's the Roman Catholic Church radically 
changed their liturgy and their existing fences are now used 
only rarely. 
H 
heaven noun 1. Imagined to be a place of eternal bliss in 
spite of the fact that no one has sufficient imagination to 
picture either bliss or eternity. Also thought to be somewhere 
in the sky or beyond it. With our modem understanding of 
the structure of the universe, this idea has become very 
difficult to believe. Some imagine an existence after death 
for the elect somewhere up, but it has become impossible to 
see in these images much beyond the making of jokes. 
Floating above pink clouds in a white gown with wings while 
playing music on a golden harp does not strike the writers of 
this dictionary as being interesting. 2. Heaven is often 
imagined to be part of a system· of rewards and punishments 
in which the just, or the faithful, or the chosen are given the 
ultimate grand prize while the rest of us go to hell. All such 
systems are individualistic and narcissistic, but they do 
appeal to those who imagine themselves either among the 
elect or among those who run the system. It is difficult to 
comprehend the amount of fruitless anguish which has 
consumed thosewho have worried over what might await 
them after death. 3. Heaven is better seen as the state of 
being completely in the sight and care of God while knowing 
that such is the case. (Hell is being radically apart from God, 
if such be possible.) Either heaven or hell is best seen as real 
possibility in the now. 4. It is much more fruitful to use the 
word and image of paradise. Paradise has no fixed location 
or time in our witness, and we leave it to God to create such 
a place and life. See hell and paradise. 
hell noun 1. Thought to be a place of torment and the just 
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desserts of the unfaithful. Such requires both an ill-tempered 
and vengeful God and doubtful manipulations of scripture 
and sensibility. These things come from imagining 
extensions of narcissism beyond the grave. Nonetheless, 
orthodox "keepers of the keys" place great stock in a system 
of rewards and punishments. 2. In this individualistic age 
many do imagine that one can be punished eternally for not 
believing the right thing, for not doing the right thing, or for 
not belonging to the right group. These views are held 
chiefly by those who think that they believe the right thing, 
do the right things, and belong to the one true church. We 
have no wish to be judgmental, but it does strike us as at 
least possible that the motives are self-justification and fear. 
3. Actually to be in hell is to be forgotten by God and
unknown to God. It is not, however, clear that such a state
is possible even if that should be a person's deepest desire.
(Psalm 139: 7-12) Neither is it clear that any one of us
receives his or her just desserts. (Psalm 103: 8-14) 4. It is
much more likely that those who choose to flee from God
will get their wish - for a time. Nonetheless, it seems certain
that God will not cease to love them. If we have been
admonished to love our enemies (Matthew 5: 43-8), will not
God do the same for those who choose to be his enemies? 5.
It follows that both heaven and hell are vital symbols which
are bound neither to a linear sense of time nor to a system of
justice but which are ever present and intimate possibilities.
If we try to move beyond this simple statement, we would be
attempting to change God from immeasurable mystery into
that which we can manage. See grace and heaven.
M 
miracle noun 1. Describes any phenomenon in the natural 
world which goes against the laws of nature, which is 
beneficent, and which is, therefore, caused by a supernatural 
being. 2. This is a modem definition which came into use 
with William of Ockham in the fourteenth century, and it is 
clear that the biblical writers had no such understanding. 
The distinction between miraculous events and the rest 
became prominent only after the Enlightenment when, as 
Laplace remarked to Napoleon, the hypothesis of God was 
no longer necessary. Miracle then emerged as supernatural 
diddling with the laws of nature, congenially and 
apologetically retaining a diminishing preserve for the action 
of a rational and domesticated God. See gaps. 3. Any event -
natural vs. supernatural is not the issue - which opens to and 
drives home the truth about reality, about the relationship 
between God and humanity. As such the miraculous is 
always revelation, the laying bare of truth, and revelation is 
always decreation. See monotheism. All things are potential 
bearers of miracle. 4. The occurrences of the word in the 
English Bible are few, and it is always possible to find 
another word that is closer to the original, such as sign, 
wonder, or act of power. 5. The great miracles in the 
Christian tradition are the creation and the incarnation, 
which entries see. Neither is plausible, likely, or reasonable, 
but then neither is the very existence of God or anything else. 
See metatheology and science. 
Q 
question noun 1. A sentence or statement which invites or 
requires a response. 2. There are several varieties, but the 
ones that are of the most interest to theology are often not 
even seen as questions at all. 3. The most common types are 
the ones that either have answers or the presumption of an 
answer. Most of what passes for education in the modem 
age consist oflearning to state the questions and expound the 
answers. In this way both students and teachers can be 
assessed, i.e., judged, and it becomes possible to reform and 
improve education. Thus students in school will be sure that 
Boise is the capital of Montana, and students in Sunday 
School will be sure that Noah's wife was Joan of Ark, and 
our educational professionals will know what to do. 4. On 
another level other professionals will do research and find 
new answers and perhaps even Joan's Ark. This will provide 
new information and larger and larger libraries, and soon the 
human race will know more stuff than it could ever use. 5. 
Nonetheless, research in itself is more boon than bane, and 
it can even be done on the biblical texts. Such is certainly 
fine, and so it is that people ask questions of the Bible. They 
expect answers too; for what else have they been educated? 
At this point the witnesses of religion and history veer far 
from the culture, and the people who live in that culture find 
themselves in a strange land indeed. The Bible is filled with 
questions, and so is the history, but they are of a wholly 
different order. They may not even have "correct" answers, 
and the skills of professionals won't help either. The one who 
goes to the text in search of answers to questions is very 
likely to find that the text is asking rather than answering. 
This is disconcerting to say the least, and the result is often 
an even more diligent search for answers as if the text were 
some giant puzzle which can only be solved by great effort. 
The search is interesting, but ultimately ends where it began, 
that is where the question from the text was encountered. 6. 
Some examples will illustrate what happens. "What is 
truth?" (John 18:38) [No answer is given.] ''What is his 
(God's) name? ''What shall I say to them (the Israelites)?" 
(Exodus 3: 13-4) [The answer given is beyond human 
comprehension.] ''Who do you say that I am?" (Matthew 
16: 15) [The answer is open; we may respond as we like. If 
this were not so we would have no freedom worthy of the 
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term.] Sometimes the question is implied: "If you had faith 
the size of a mustard seed, you could say to this mulberry 
tree, 'Be uprooted and planted in the sea,' and it would obey 
you." (Luke 17: 5-6) [Well? Probably not.] "Whoever does 
not love abides in death." (lJohn 3: 14) [Again, well?] 7. 
These questions are always open and honestly so. This is 
rarely understood, and many earnest folk believe that all of 
them are in the same class as "What is the capital of 
Montana?" Those who are on the right side will, therefore, 
study and learn the right answer. To be sure, some answers 
are better than others, and Boise is in Idaho. It is, however, 
much closer to the truth to say that God's freedom is a real 
freedom (Galatians 5: 1) and not simply the freedom to chose 
one's slave master. If this misunderstood and under 
appreciated gift of God were truly taken for what it is, the 
questions that we find, or which find us, could be seen for 
what they are. See answer and puzzle. 
s 
saint noun 1. A person who is chosen by God for a life of 
holiness. 2. This is both paradox and mystery because 
holiness is a property of God alone and because no person is 
capable of attaining it. Nonetheless, God does give special 
gifts to certain sinners that make them markers of 
God's holy actions in the world. The saint is given the gift 
of sight as few of us have. 3. A saint has, therefore, a 
profound sense of his or her own faults and sinfulness. In 
the second place he or she refuses to let this condition 
prevent the action that comes from being faithful, even as it 
is well understood what the likely outcome will be. A living 
saint is a sinner who has made significant progress in the 
transformation from self-centeredness to reality and Being, 
i.e., God. See martyr. 4. It is hard to imagine that anyone
could live a life of being a saint all the time, and it is like -
wise hard to imagine that anyone goes through life without
ever acquiring saintliness, at least for a time. 5. Dividing the 
human race into saints and sinners makes very little sense. 
Likewise with imagining that saints are dead sinners, whose 
lives have been edited by selective memories. See sin and 
holiness. 
secular, the noun 1. The literal meaning is those things that 
are in time, in the sense of chronos. See time. 2. The 
antonym is the eternal, which stands for those things outside 
of chronos but inside kairos (God's sense of time). 3. The 
usual understanding is that the sacred is the opposite of the 
secular, but this is an error. Everything in creation is good 
and, therefore, sacred (Genesis 1 :31), so it can not be that 
things within time are not good. 4. The distinctions made 
between sacred and secular times are useful to human 
beings, who after all have a dreadful time with Genesis 1: 31, 
and God approves us. (Mark 2:23-8) 5. The secular may 
also refer to things not of the church, and so it is possible to 
refer to secular government or secular science simply to note 
that the structure of the visible church, which too is sinful, 
does not control these things. See profane and sacred. 
T 
trash noun I. That which is discarded as being of no use 
and a chief result of modem commerce. A modem idol, 
worshiped by nearly everyone, is economic growth, and a 
clear measure of it is the amount of trash which a society 
produces. If by some means we could devise an economic 
system in which only what is needed would be purchased 
and consumed, a great economic depression would occur. By 
this logic trash is good. 2. In the logic of the biblical 
witnesses, trash can not exist. Everything that God made is 
good, indeed it is very good (Genesis 1:31), and it is only 
human blindness which causes us to believe that any one 




THE UNIVERSITY IN THE CITY OF GOD: 
BEYOND DIALECTICS AND RHETORIC 
GREGORY A. CLARK 
"I don't want to be deceived," he said. "I am looking to 
Reason to keep me from illusion." Jerry was one of my 
brightest philosophy majors. His father was a pastor. 
Under the influence of higher criticism of the Bible and 
Nietzsche, however, the effect of countless sermons and his 
religious upbringing had diminished. Jerry was convinced 
that his father was deceived and that Jerry himself had been 
brought up in a faith that was little more than wishful 
thinking. "Reason" was going to protect him from illusions 
that might try to trap him later in life. 
The dichotomy is common and ancient: truth opposes 
illusion, reason opposes power, philosophy opposes rhetoric, 
and real argument opposes merely verbal links in discourse. 
Almost every philosopher since Plato, who sets out the 
dichotomy in the Apology, dwells on these oppositions. 
Interestingly, even those who chasten and restrict reason do 
not hesitate to make the opposition and condemn rhetoric. 
Alasdair MacIntyre offers up a familiar and representative 
lamentation: "In the forums of popular life rhetorical 
effectiveness in persuasion and manipulation prevails against 
rational argument.." 1 
The concepts of "power" and "violence" provide the basis for 
the opposition. According to philosophy, rhetoric values 
effectiveness and power, regardless of the rational merits of 
the case. Violence destroys or tears apart integrity -- the 
integrity of the will, of the mind, of the body. Rhetorical 
power becomes violent when it does not respect the 
rationality and will of the hearer, when it aims to impose the 
will of the speaker on the hearer. 
While traditional philosophers want to avoid violence, 
postmodern philosophers think that violence is unavoidable, 
but that some forms of violence are better than others. That 
is, philosophers like Nietzsche and Deleuze maintain the 
dichotomy, but they defend the sophists. Everything is the 
will to power. Dialectical argument merely disguises the 
will that seeks to dominate other wills. It is not on that 
account less a will. 
Gregory A. Clark teaches in the Philosophy Department at 
North Park University. 
Any cnt1c1sm of the Enlightenment and contemporary 
Christian higher education must consider the relation 
postmodemism, (2) the ethic of love and peace espoused 
by the Christian Church, and (3) the meeting of (1) and (2) 
in the church-related college. I believe that we must think 
about how to construct a university where the rhetorical 
power of this dichotomy between rhetoric and dialectics no 
longer holds the minds of students like Jerry.·· We must both 
break down the dichotomy and learn to value the power of 
words. 
Accordingly, I will begin with an account of Maclntyre's 
proposal, in his book Three Rival Versions of Moral 
Enquiry, for a postliberal university. Maclntyre's postliberal 
university institutionalizes the conflict of wills that 
postmodemism claims is everywhere. I will then tum to 
John Milbank's criticism of Maclntyre's position. According 
to Milbank, Maclntyre's position is neither Christian nor 
postmodern. I will sketch a part of Milbank's criticism of 
MacIntyre in order to show some problems with taking the 
postliberal university as a model for a church-related 
college. Finally, I will offer a modest proposal for the form 
of discourse the should prevail in a church-related college. 
I. The Postliberal University
In his Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, Alasdair
MacIntyre distinguishes three types of universities. The
preliberal university of 18th and 19th century Scotland and
the United States could assume a fairly homogeneous and
well-educated public. Aided by religious tests to exclude
and promote faculty1, it was able to advance considerably.
The preliberal university produced a constrained agreement.
The liberal university claims to open its doors to all. By 
doing away with religious tests, it would promote progress 
and agreement in all areas of knowledge. The liberal 
university, then, claims to produce an unconstrained 
agreement. In fact, however, we can now see that the liberal 
university does impose constraints. Further, these 
constraints have cost the liberal university the resources to 
understand and to justify its own existence. 
If we cannot return to the constrained agreement of the 
preliberal university, nor to the feigned unconstrained 
Intersections/Winter 1998 
15 
agreement of the liberal university, where shall we go? 
MacIntyre suggests that we should develop a university 
system that will be a "place of constrained disagreement, or 
imposed participation in conflict, in which a central 
responsibility of higher education would be to initiate 
students into conflict. "2 What would this look like? 
MacIntyre continues, 
Surely a set of rival universities would result, each modeled 
on, but improving upon, its own best predecessor . ... And 
thus the wider society would be confronted with the claims 
of rival universities, each advancing its own enquiries in its 
own terms and each securing the type of agreement 
necessary to ensure the progress and flourishing of its 
enquiries by its own set of exclusions and prohibitions ... 
. But then also required would be a set of institutionalized 
forums in which the debate between rival types of enquiry 
was afforded rhetorical expression. 3 
Madntyre's postliberal university has two tiers, both of 
which emphasize constraint and conflict. First, the 
university must establish its own identity. This university 
will look much like the preliberal university that embodies a 
constrained agreement. That is to say, arguments alone are 
not enough to establish agreement; there must be some 
authority to enforce agreement. For the Thomist university, 
this authority will be the church, and ultimately the Pope.4 
This is not a simple sectarianism, however. Maclntyre's 
sketch of the university is an attempt to institutionally 
embody a tradition and to allow for dialogue between other 
mstitutionalized versions of moral enquiry. If this were 
sectarian, they would never come into contact with each 
other. So, second, the universities in the system need to 
engage in open hostilities on a level fighting field. In spite of 
the claim, in Three Rival Versions, that this conflict will 
have a rhetorical expression, Whose Justice? Which 
Rationality? clearly indicates that these conflicts are 
mediated dialectically. Moral enquiry progresses, according 
to MacIntyre, through open argument both within a 
tradition and across traditions. The best tradition will be 
able to solve the problems of other traditions and be able to 
account for the failure of the inferior tradition. Let us then 
defme the postliberal university as a place of dialectically 
mediated conflict and constrained agreement. Such is the 
postmodern opportunity for the university according to 
MacIntyre. 
II. The City of God
MacIntyre has come under attack by John Milbank in his
Theology and Social Theory. 5 According to Milbank,
Maclntyre's move to dialectics in Whose Justice? Which
Rationality?6 shows that he is too much the philosopher and 
not sufficiently Christian or postmodern. Dialectics is itself 
a form of the will to power. Insofar as MacIntyre does not 
realize this, he has not yet crossed the bridge of 
postmodemity. Insofar as he still appeals to dialectics, he 
remains within an ontology of violence and has not yet taken 
up the cross of Christian peace. 
I am interested in the second criticism for the purposes of 
this essay. That is, I want to ask if violence and conflict are 
necessary and constitutive parts of the life of the mind. If 
dialectics is itself the embodiment of conflict, how might we 
begin to think differently? In what follows, I will first draw 
the distinction between the ontology of violence and the 
ontology of peace. I will then contrast Macintyre's Thomist 
postliberal university with the church-related college. 
A. Counter Ontologies
An ontology of violence posits a primordial conflict that 
politics, morality, and dialectics each attempt to overcome or 
limit with another act of violence. Milbank finds an 
"ontology of violence" in the philosophy and institutions of 
the ancients, the modems, and the postmodems. Since the 
ancients and the postmodems are committed to an ontology 
of violence, Maclntyre's choice between Aristotle and 
Nietzsche does not present us with true alternatives. 
In contrast with the history of philosophy, Milbank finds an 
"ontology of peace" expressed in Augustine's The City of 
God. Peace is a harmonious agreement based in charity. 
Christianity posits an ontology of peace because God is the 
most basic reality, and the God of Christians is a God who 
is love in trinity and who created the universe out of 
generosity and love. Milbank argues that only Christianity 
provides an ontological option to violence. The church is 
that society which promotes and incarnates the charity made 
possible through the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus. 
B. Counter Universities
While Milbank does not consider the implications of his .. 
criticism for a university or for a church-related college, one 
might easily generate a series of questions that extend th. 
criticism to Maclntyre's proposal f or the postlibe 
university. Is a "place of constrained disagreement, · 
imposed participation in conflict" compatible with a soci 
founded on an ontology of peace? Can a higher educati 
that is Christian both attend to its identity withinJ 
Christian tradition and engage in open hostilities ... 
instituted in the postliberal university? Can a postlib( 
university exist in the City of God? 
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If Macintyre's post-liberal university and the church-related 
college are rooted in mutually exclusive categories, then the 
postliberal university would amount to an institutionalized 
hostility to Christian identity. To take Maclntyre's 
postliberal university as the model for the church-related 
college would be to forfeit the college's identity in the 
mission of the church. I will argue that Maclntyre's 
postliberal university is modeled on an ontology of violence 
insofar as it defines itself by dialectical argument. The 
church-related college articulates an ontology of peace 
insofar as it embodies a history of faith and persuasion. 
L The Thomist University 
Consider first the Thomist postliberal university. Thomism, 
for MacIntyre, is part of the history of philosophy or 
intellectual history. 7 He reads Thomas, in the end, as a 
philosopher rather than as a theologian whose work reflects 
the faith and practice of the church. Thomism is a set of 
beliefs, an intellectual position, an extended dialectical 
argument, that is, a tradition. 
A Thomism instituted in a postliberal university requires 
conflict. This conflict 1s mediated dialectically. Otherwise 
said, dialectic is the intellectual management of conflict. 
The Platonic dialogues, Aristotle's method, and Thomas's 
method show dialectics as the attempt to bring many 
competing voices into a unified harmony.8 This unified 
harmony is the Idea of the Good and of peace. 9 
Postmodemism asks whether dialectics can bring about such 
harmony. Socrates and Plato face this question when they 
confront the Sophists, and Aristotle confronts it as well, 
since "good" can be said in many ways. Plato, Aristotle, and 
many Thomisms were not entirely successful in achieving a 
harmony through dialectical means. Neither did the 
preliberal or liberal university succeed. While MacIntyre 
appeals to dialectics, agreement within the postliberal 
Thomist university is itself guaranteed by a decree of the 
Pope. If dialectics cannot establish harmony, "then only a 
merely 'effective' peace is possible, a 'secular' peace of 
temporarily suspended violence or regulated competition." 10 
That is, the conflict is only resolved by one party imposing 
their will on another. 
2. The Church-Related College
Contrast the Thomist university with the nature of the 
church-related college. The church-related college differs 
from non-affiliated colleges in that it serves the mission of 
the church in some way. The church is the community of 
those people whose lives have been claimed by the God who 
is love and peace. The preeminence of the peace of the 
Lord, however, is not established or shown dialectically, by 
managing conflict through argument. Rather, it 1s 
established by God in Jesus, and it is shown in the life and 
preaching of the church. Phillips Brooks says, 
However, the Gospel may be capable of statement in 
dogmaticform, its truest element we know is not in dogma 
but in personal l�fe. Christianity is Christ; and we can 
easily understand how a truth which is of such a peculiar 
character that a person can stand forth and say of it, "I am 
the Truth," must always be best conveyed through, must 
indeed be almost incapable of being perfectly conveyed 
except through, personality. And so some form al 
preaching must be essential to the prevalence and spread 
of the knowledge of Christ among men. II 
Note two interrelated points. First, while dogmas are 
important and necessary, the church is not founded on 
dogma or a set of articles. Second, and this is crucial, this 
first point does not mean that we stop preaching. Jesus 
preached: Peter and Paul preached. In preaching, the church 
takes its native form. As a form of discourse, preaching's 
primary goal is not to establish any given set of ideas. The 
truth of the gospel is the person of Jesus, and this truth is 
communicated through the personality of the preacher as he 
or she preaches. Preaching articulates a counter-logos which 
is neither dialectical or sophistical rhetoric. It is more 
original than either. The Christian logos gives "pride of 
place to opinion (doxa), testimony (marturia) and 
persuasion (pis tis). " 12 The God of peace is revealed through 
the power of the Word. 
Both of these points help to clarify the difference between 
the Thomist university and the church-related college. The 
church-related college is not founded on any one doctrine or 
school of thought, and its goal is not to produce more and 
better scholars. Perhaps Thomism is a tradition of moral 
enquiry: Christianity is not. While Christianity has much to 
say about the things that concerned philosophers, it is not on 
that account oriented and guided by philosophy. Christianity 
is not one more competing vision of the good life. It is not 
graspable through dialectics; it is not itself promulgated 
through dialectics. It is a mode of discourse aiming to reveal 
the God of peace with whom the apostles were acquainted. 
"Perhaps," Milbank says, "we have to take more seriously 
the Biblical narratives ... which presumably tell how things 
happened in the very idiom adopted by their users for the 
making-of-things-to-happen." 13 
Further, this "idiom," this preaching that humans can now be 
reconciled to God and to each other, contains an acid that 
cannot be neutralized by philosophical systems or 
arguments, and this too can be seen in the preaching of the 
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apostles. John Howard Yoder observes that the apostles did 
not request "free speech and room for one more stand in the 
Athenian marketplace of ideas for a new variant of already 
widely respected diaspora Judaism." Rather, 
A handful of messianic Jews, moving beyond the defenses 
of their somewhat separate society to attack the intellectual 
bastions of majority culture, refused to contextualize their 
message by clothing it in the categories the world held 
ready. Instead, they seized the categories, hammered them 
into other shapes, and turned the cosmology on its head. 
. . The development of a high Christology is the natural 
cultural ricochet of a missionary ecclesiology when it 
collides as it must with whatever cosmology explains and 
governs the world. 14 
In the arena of ideas, Christians do not fight fairly. Which 
is to say that they don't fight. They do not pit Christian 
ideas against non-Christian ideas. Rather, they introduce the 
person of Christ who is irreducible to any and all ideas. 
Christianity will always oppose the absoluteness and 
adequacy of every system or idea, while refusing itself to be 
reduced to a system or an idea. Philosophy will always find 
Christianity an unassimilatable phenomenon. Like the Son 
of Man, Christianity is nomadic. It is the reef upon which 
the ships of idolatrous philosophies are wrecked. The effect 
of this preaching, Yoder insists, is an intellectual pluralism 
and relativism, for 
pluralism/relativism is a confusing world, but it is not an 
alien one. It is the child of the Hebrew and Christian 
intervention in cultural history. It is the spinojf from 
missionary mobility, from the love of the enemy, from the 
relativizing of political sovereignty, from a dialogical 
vision of the church,.from a charismatic vision of the many 
members of the body, from the disavowal of empire and 
theocracy. It lays b�fore us the challenge of convincing 
interlocutors who are not our dependents, of affirming a 
particular witness to be good news without being interested 
in showing that other people are bad. 15 
The Christian witness, like the Word about which it testifies, 
is active and affirming. Conflict with and reaction to "other 
views" does not constitute the first move or have priority. 16 
The first move in the Christian witness is not our move at 
all. Rather, God comes and reveals himself to us as love. 
Our response to God's love constitutes the second move. 
The second move is not exclusively or primarily a matter of 
intellectual assent but an obedience expressed in love for 
one's neighbor. This is the essentially active and affirming 
nature of the Word and of the preaching of Christian 
witness. Only such a Word and such a witness can embody 
an affirmation of power that is non-violent. 
This non-violent affirmation precedes the violence of both 
rhetoric and dialectics, as well as the violence embodied in 
the dichotomy between rhetoric and dialectics. That is, the 
Christian witness refuses to impose its will on others, either 
dialectically or rhetorically (I Cor. I: 17, 2: 13), for this is the 
way God treats us. 17 This feature of the Christian witness 
prevents the church-related college from taking the 
postliberal university as an acceptable model. 
MacIntyre himself catches sight of part of the problem when 
he ceases to play the role of the philosopher. He claims "this 
divorce between rhetorical effectiveness and rational 
argumentation is deeply at odds with the thirteenth-century 
Dominican ideal, especially as articulated by Aquinas, in 
which the homily was to be the end-product of an education 
in philosophy and theology. " 18 The divorce also runs 
counter to the self-understanding and goals of many of those 
who founded our church-related colleges, not for training 
scholars capable of engaging successfully in dialectical 
warfare, but for preparing those capable of being witnesses 
(µap·rnpEc;) of Jesus. 
The affirmative message of Christian preaching does 
respond to "other views," but only as a third moment in the 
Christian witness. These other positions are not merely 
"unjustified," or "an expression of (bad) power," but 
"idolatrous." The category of idolatry indicates that the 
problem is not so much intellectual confusion or dullness, 
but our disordered loves. These disordered loves can keep 
us from confronting God as a person, rather than as an idea, 
and they bar us from full participation in the City of God. 
Preaching introduces disordered lovers to the God who is 
love. The church-related college, taking its guide from the 
preaching of the church, seeks to educate our desires and set 
them in order. 
III. Conclusion
Jerry, the student to whom I referred above, understood
Christianity as a set of beliefs that have an absolute status.
He thought that he had lost his faith when he exchanged one
set of absolute ideas for another set of equally absolute
ideas. The first set of ideas had been instilled in his mind
rhetorically; the second set imparted dialectically. He
thought that "Reason" stood outside of all power and could
save him from "illusion."
Neither the liberal or the postliberal university have the 
resources to respond to Jerry's loss of faith, for they are 
rooted in a dialectically managed conflict of ideas. That is, 
postmodernism shows us that dialectics, rhetoric, and the 
opposition between them all assume a form of violence. By 
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institutionalizing these forms of discourse, both the liberal 
and postliberal universities ultimately underwrite an 
unavoidable violence. 
The God worshiped by Christians is a God of love and 
peace. Thus, the church-related college must institutionally 
embody an ontology of non-violence both in what it says and 
in its mode of speaking. The message proclaimed by 
Christians, therefore, takes the form of preaching. Preaching 
calls for a transformation of the entire person. The truths of 
Christianity are not known cheaply or without personal risk. 
The church-related college, if it is to train preachers, must 
educate not the minds of students to be scholars, but the 
loves and desires of persons to be a preacher. 
The Christian witness will not always convince modernist 
students like Jerry. It will not overwhelm the 
postmodernists. This is the risk it takes in affirming non­
violence. In a postmodern era, it is this affirmation that 
provides the church-related college with its most valuable 
resource. 
NOTES 
l. Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry (Notre Dame,
1990) 168.
2. MacIntyre says "Cleghorn was rightly preferred to Hume
for the chair in moral philosophy at Edinburgh" (TRY, 224).
3. TRY, 230-1.
4. TRY, 234.
5. This is Macintyre's position in Whose Justice? Which
Rationality? (Notre Dame, 1988). See Martha Nussbaum's
review ofMacJntyre's position in "Recoiling from Reason,"
New York Review of Books (7 December 1989)36-41.
6. Blackwell, 1993.
7. MacIntyre is less dialectical, I think, in both After Virtue
and in Three Rival Versions.
8. MacIntyre does insist on the importance of various
practices for an intellectual tradition. Nevertheless, he fails
to show how Christian theology emerges out of the life and




12. Phillips Brooks, The Joy of Preaching (Grand Rapids:
Kregel Publications, 1989) 27. This means that books, e­
texts, the world wide web, or video courses are less than
adequate for the nature of Christian truth.
13. Milbank, 328.
14. Milbank, 121.
15. Yoder, "But We Do See Jesus," The Priestly Kingdom:
Social Ethics as Gospel (Notre Dame, 1984) 54.
16. Yoder, 60.
17. My concern here is motivated in part by Nietzsche,
Toward a Genealogy of of Morals, Essay I, X. See also
Paul Ricoeur, "Negativity and Primary Affirmation,"
History and Truth (Northwestern University Press, 1965)
305-328.
18. See Pascal's Pensees for the development of this theme.
19. TRV, 169. While I do not want to identify the homily
with the various form that preaching may take, it is perhaps
an ideal that can orient us.
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A RESPONSE TO GREGORY CLARK 
A God of Peace and Love? - -
Reflections From a Biblical Scholar 
Karla G. Bohmbach 
As a member of this journal's editorial board, one of my 
duties is to read and evaluate articles submitted for 
publication as they are sent my way by the editor, Tom 
Christenson. When I read Gregory Clark's article, I thought 
definitely that we should publish it. My main comment to 
Tom was that it would be greatly desirable to solicit 
respondents who might interrogate further the practicality of 
Clark's proposal for church-related colleges. In the back of 
my mind, as I made that comment to Tom, I thought of how 
much I was looking forward to reading such responses when 
the issue came out. Tom had other ideas. He requested a 
response from me. What has resulted is actually some 
questions, derived mainly from my work as a scholar of 
biblical studies. I hope such questions prompt further 
comment - and further questions! - from readers. 
Gregory Clark affirms the stance taken by John Milbank -
that all philosophies and institutions, whether ancient, 
modem, or postmodern, are built on an ontology of violence. 
In this way a critique is made of Alasdair Maclntyre's 
position concernmg the postmodern liberal university, which, 
for MacIntyre, would be a place of constrained agreement 
(and so, presumably, non-violent). The problem for Clark, 
who is following Milbank here, is that such a university, 
insofar as it engaged with other "institutionalized versions of 
moral enquiry" would remain within an ontology of violence. 
For these engagements would be managed dialectically, and 
dialectics can never lead to harmony but, at most, only a sort 
of managed conflict which, in the end, is still violent. 
Instead of an ontology of violence, Clark desires an ontology 
of peace. He argues that such an ontology of peace is to be 
found in the person of Jesus, the person who preeminently 
reveals "the God who is love and peace." As a biblical 
scholar, my reaction is to interrogate the ways in which 
Jesus did, and did not, reveal such a God. 
Jesus lived in a violent world. And far from shying away 
from that world and its violence, he seems to have 
deliberately opened himself up to it. Although his message 
was greeted frequently with suspicion, skepticism, and 
Karla G. Bohmbach is Assistant Professor of Religion at 
Susquehanna University, Selinsgrove, Pa. 
vilification, he did not back down or retreat from it, even 
when, as one account has it, the people of his own hometown 
attempted to kill him (Luke 4: 14 - 30). Eventually he set his 
face toward Jerusalem, even though he knew the sharp 
opposition facing him there from the religious authorities. 
And, once in Jerusalem, he engaged in an act that most see 
as the precipitating event of his final suffering: the 
overturning of the moneychangers' tables in the Temple 
itself. Although it may not have been as physically violent as 
has been depicted in such movies as Jesus Christ Superstar, 
the act at least had overtones of violence. Not only, then, 
does Jesus receive violence onto himself, here, at least, he 
actually imposes it on others. Jesus' violence begets further 
violence, now enacted against him, as he is arrested, tried, 
scourged, and crucified - a sequence of events which, by 
all accounts, was horrifically violent. 
Not only was violence a part of Jesus' life, he also warned 
his followers that such would be their fate: 
"Do not think that I have come to bring peace to the earth; 
I have not come to bring peace, but a sword. For I have 
come to set a man against his father, and a daughter against 
her mother and a daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law; 
and one's foes will be members of one's own household" 
(Matt. 10: 34-36; cf. Luke 12: 51-53). 
If, indeed, the God who is found in Jesus is a God of love 
and peace, it seems that the love and peace comes about in 
and through the acceptance of violence - and the suffering 
that often accompanies such violence. The events of the 
Passions, which lie at the very center of Jesus' life and 
mission, are an overwhelming witness to Jesus' ready 
acceptance of, and patient bearing of, the violence being 
inflicted upon him. Followers of Jesus forget this at their 
own peril, for the message to them, too, is that if love and 
peace will be constitutive of their lives, such will not occur 
unaccompanied by, or exclusive of, violence. 
If we do as Gregory Clark urges us to do, and proclaim 
Jesus on our campuses, what would that look like? In 
particular, what would it mean if we took to heart the Jesus 
who made himself vulnerable to the violence of his world? 
We, too, live in a violent world. Dare we look unblinkingly 
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into the face of such violence, take it upon ourselves, and 
even, if called upon to do so, bear up and suffer in some way 
because of it? As staff, administrators, and teachers on 
college campuses related to the church, how might our tasks 
be affected, even altered, by a serious living out of the 
words. 
WHAT I HAVE LEARNED: MAYBE PLATO WAS RIGHT 
Richard Yivisaker 
A popular view of Plato holds that his world view has had 
a great and largely detrimental influence while being 
transparently false. I have not been immune to this oddly 
dismissive attitude. It is with no little surprise, in fact, that 
I have gradually come to see that Plato may have been 
right. About everything? No. About some important things, 
however, clearly yes. I want to fix on one point in 
particular, a point which reverberates in a special way for 
those who inhabit the academic world. But first a brief 
consideration of some other points where Plato had an 
insight that merits preserving. 
PRELIMINARY EXAMPLES 
(1) Communities Are Not Necessarily Better Off By
Becoming More Diverse.
We do not have to accept the vision of social differentiation 
and hierarchy idealized in the Republic to see the truth in 
Plato's view that a good society requires unity in diversity. 
Diversity. may be necessary, but it is not sufficient. It 
contains the seeds of discord and disintegration along with 
the potential for enriched life, as homogeneity brings unity 
while threatening loss of vitality and decay .. Everything 
depends on the wedding of diversity to some unity of 
purpose. We may accept Charles Taylor's notion that a 
''presumption" of value is owed to any deeply rooted 
culture, but this presumption has to be tested in an 
encounter of cultures whose outcome is uncertain. 1 This 
requires a commitment to such encounter on the part of the 
community, and this commitment is. the unity of purpose 
which constitutes the community. If we were to turn our 
attention to the call for increased diversity at colleges of the 
church, creating the necessary unity in diversity would be 
a major task. It is not a matter of simple addition. 
(2) If Politics Is. To Be More Than A Struggle For
Richard Yivisaker is Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at 
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Power By Competing Interests, It Has To Be Assumed 
That There Is A Moral Basis For Politics Which 
Transcends Special Interests. 
Indeed, even the rightful pursuit of power on behalf of a 
. particular interest assumes this. In our commitment to 
democratic politics we may reject some or all of the extreme 
measures to which Plato is led by this assumption. But the 
challenge of constructing a democratic process consistent 
with it is great. This may not mean, as it did for Plato, that 
the challenge is unmeetable. But the reduction of democracy 
to a naked or thinly disguised struggle for power parades 
itself daily. 2 Plato knew a difficult problem when he saw 
one. 
(3) The Much-Derided Dualism of Body And Soul
Contains A Measure Of Truth.
Even ifwe take the radical dualism in Phaedo at face value, 
there is more to be said for it than fashionable criticism 
allows. We want to say, of course, that the very idea of 
disembodied existence is both unappealing and barely 
conceivable (if conceivable at all). But this does not remove 
the problems of embodied life which rightly concerned 
Plato. 
Of particular interest is his worry about the impact of 
embodiment on our cognitive life. For embodied creatures 
awareness of the world is mediated by organs which register 
and transmit sensory data. This leads to diverse points of 
view, depending on species nature, on individual physiology 
and psychology, on space-time location, and on cultural 
factors carried by language. The hope of liberating rational 
consciousness from such dependence may strike us as 
fanciful if not preposterous. As may the idea that we can 
aspire to a form of consciousness which is without any 
point of view and thus god-like. But bridging differences in 
point of view is a cognitive (and moral) imperative for us. 
So also, then, is discovering a process which in some way 
makes this possible. Plato saw all of this with great clarity. 
The point here is related to the earlier ones about morality 
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and politics and unity in diversity, and it brings us to the 
idea that I have come to see as Plato's deepest. 
TOWARD A COMMUNITY OF DISCOURSE 
Another surprise for me over the years has been discovering 
the strength of the penchant for doctrinaire pronouncement 
among academic people. Our fondness for mere opinion, in 
other words. Deconstructionists and Foucaultians will smile 
knowingly at my belated loss of innocence. But we needn't 
be deterred by their deflation of rational discourse as an 
illusion masking some will to power or fear of the free play 
of interpretation. Either they must defend their deflationary 
strategy incoherently (with an appeal to reasoned argument) 
or they offer us no reason to accept it. So we are free to 
reconsider Plato's commitment to the dynamics of reason. 
The distinction between knowledge and opinion is central to 
the Republic. It was Plato's way of repudiating the 
reduction of knowledge to power or to groundless 
interpretation. Without this distinction the search for solid 
moral judgment is meaningless and the good life therefore 
impossible. Surely Plato was right about this. If personal 
or collective opinion is the last word, the true and the good 
are defined simply by our assent and thus become 
dispensable notions, except as tools of persuasion which 
work only until they are unmasked. 
On the other hand, Plato's use of this distinction is 
problematic. Taking it as a given epistemically, he makes it 
call for a parallel and equally sharp distinction between the 
objects of knowledge and opinion: they cannot be distinct 
purchases on reality unless they are about different realities. 
Epistemology thus entails metaphysics. In this way the 
original distinction produces a fundamental divide between 
stable, mind-transcending models or exemplars (the Forms) 
and the space-time particulars which are their images. 
We are rightly suspicious of the claim that knowledge and 
opinion cannot be about the same objects, even ifwe agree 
that epistemically there is a qualitative difference between 
them. But Plato's mistake is not the blatant one it is often 
taken to be. Crucial marks of knowledge cannot be detached 
from metaphysical considerations. For example, legitimate 
claims to know must be supported by good reasons, by 
"reasoned discourse" or "a reasoned account of reality" 
which can "survive all refutations," as Socrates puts it in 
Republic VU. If we grant this, we cannot avoid the 
question: About what sort of reality is it possible to have 
"reasoned discourse"? Which puts us firmly on the path of 
metaphysics. So Plato's attempt to harvest metaphysical hay 
from the field of common-sense epistemology has something 
to be said for it. 
More important, however, is the way questions about the 
links between knowledge, reasoned discourse, and reality 
are embedded for Plato in questions about the good 
community. Epistemology and metaphysics are inseparable 
from ethics. Even ifwe are skeptical about his metaphysical 
enterprise and suspicious of the social and ontological 
hierarchies to which it leads, we do well to ponder his 
insistence on the link between reasoned discourse and 
community. For the larger society his vision of a 
community built on reasoned discourse may be utopian; for 
an academic community it should not be. It matters -
especially in such a community - how the views we hold are 
supported and defended. Being right is not enough: better 
to be wrong with good reason than right with bad ( or no) 
reasons. So I have slowly learned. This may seem obvious, 
too obvious to have to be learned. But in my experience 
tough-mindedness about the pedigree of your own beliefs, 
especially the ones you hold dear, is not easy to come by. 3 
TWO CASES 
Possible examples of the difficulty are legion. I choose two 
which are of particular interest to me. In each case the 
choice reflects my confidence both about an important truth 
and about the negligence of a particular defense of it 
( l) The Death Penalty Is Wrong And Should Be
Abolished.
I have little doubt about the truth of this, though the tide m 
our country is running the other way. However, I have even 
less doubt about bad defenses of this truth. I pick one such 
defense, though a variety is ready to hand; and I pick it 
because it is close to home. 
The E.L.C.A. is in the practice of issuing social statements 
on major public issues. These statements become the basis 
for continued discussion in the church and for public policy 
advocacy. A minimal requirement is that the positions they 
adopt be defended carefully and honestly, that no shortcuts 
be taken to make them appear self-evident. An egregious 
failure to meet this requirement is provided by the church's 
1991 statement on the death penalty.4 Anyone who has 
really thought about this issue knows that the strongest case 
for retaining the death penalty is based on the demand for 
just retribution. It presses such questions as these: What 
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penalty "fits" or is "deserved by" the uniquely heinous 
crime of first degree murder? What punishment adequately 
upholds the community's consensus about the depth of the 
wrong committed by a brutal taking of innocent life? This 
case for the death penalty needs to be taken seriously by 
any convincing case against it: Can the demand for just 
retribution be met without recourse to the death penalty? If 
so, how? Is that demand itself misguided? If so, why? 
There is more than one way of minimizing this challenge. A 
common one is to equate just retribution with vengeance. 
For the E.L.C.A.'s social statement, however, the challenge 
hardly exists. Though it repeatedly cites justice as a goal of 
the church's social action, the statement shows scant 
understanding of distinctions which are crucial to 
understanding this goal. In the brief section on "Doing 
Justice,"5 we find the following: 
Violent crime is, in part, a reminder of human failure to 
ensure justice for all members of society. People often 
respond to violent crime as though it were exclusively a 
matter of the criminal's individual failure. The death 
penalty exacts and symbolizes the ultimate personal 
retribution. 
Yet, capital punishment makes no provable impact on the 
breeding grounds of violent crime. Executions harm 
society by mirroring and reinforcing existing injustice. 
The death penalty distracts us from our work toward a just 
society . . .  It perpetuates cycles of violence. 
The statement then calls for "an assault on the root causes 
of violent crime" and asserts without argument that 
problems of fairness in the administration of the death 
penalty are insurmountable. Finally, we are told that 
The practice of the death penalty undermines any possible 
moral message we might want to 'send. ' It is not fair and 
fails to make society better or safer. The message 
conveyed by an execution . . . i's one of brutality and 
violence. 6 
In a few lines the demand for just retribution is first 
slighted, then confused with different concerns, and finally 
obliterated. It is hard to imagine less regard for reasoned 
discourse. The presupposition of the argument, if there is an 
argument, is that the primary agent of crime is society, the 
alleged criminal being more a victim than a perpetrator of 
injustice. This presupposition is not self-evident; it needs to 
be argued. And it needs to be argued case by case-unless we 
fall back on a social determinism which removes all 
responsibility and with it any role for the notions of justice 
and injustice. This, too, would need to be argued. 
(2) We Must Extend The Boundaries Of Moral Concern
Beyond Humanity To Encompass All Of The Natural
World.
I find this imperative as compelling as the one about the 
death penalty. It certainly is unproblematic within a 
theocentric ethic: "The earth is the Lord's and the fulness 
thereof." But how make it compelling to resistant non­
theists? 
Consider a recent attempt in this direction: Larry 
Rasmussen's Earth Community Earth Ethics. 7 Though there 
is much to admire in Rasmussen's book, it provides another 
example of the failure to offer compelling reasons for a 
strongly held position. We may agree with Rasmussen's 
judgment that a way of life tied to a consumption-driven, 
globally expanding market economy is unsustainable and 
that its threat to ecological well-being is growing 
exponentially, and agree as well that the urgency of the 
situation calls for a paradigm shift in our moral thinking. 
But how are we to ground the necessary shift? Showing its 
utility is one thing; grounding it is something else. 
Rasmussen attempts to ground it in two ways. One is by 
expanding the realm of sentient life, life capable of 
experiencing pain; the other, as his title suggests, is by 
enlarging our view of community. Each fails even 
moderately stringent tests of rationality. The unintended 
result is to tum Rasmussen's brief for a non-homocentric 
ethic on its head. 
There is no phrase more often repeated in his book than 
''earth's distress." The less dramatic variants include 
"creation's pain," "the cry of the earth," "nature's 
suffering." Sometimes God is the one who is said to suffer 
as a result of nature's degradation. More typically, however, 
"earth," "nature," or "creation" itself is viewed as the 
subject of suffering. This way of speaking serves to make 
all of creation the focus of moral regard and to awaken 
compassion for it. But what is the basis for adopting such 
language? Rasmussen offers only constant use of the 
language, intimating that refusal to adopt it is a sign of 
homocentric arrogance. Emphatic reassertion, in other 
words, rather than argument. It would indeed be arrogance 
to deny suffering to nature where observable behavior 
displays it. But where there is no such behavior, the 
attribution of suffering becomes moralizing sentimentality. 
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Rasmussen's other attempt to ground a radical revision of 
our moral framework fails similarly: the natural world is 
charactenzed in a way which encourages the revision, but 
little rationale is offered for it beyond the characterization 
itself. This time the language is that of "cosmic 
community," "earth community," "the community of life," 
"creation as a genuine community," "nature as both the 
aboriginal and comprehensive community." Such phrases 
are used again and again as the basis for a "comprehensive 
communitarian ethic. "8 
The thinness of Rasmussen's argument is revealed as soon 
as we ask how "community" is to be understood. The 
difficulty he faces is that this concept must have moral 
import and yet be comprehensively applicable. The latter 
requirement is satisfied by explicating "community" in 
broad relational terms. We hear about the "internal 
relatedness and interdependence of creation," the 
"interconnectedness . . . among all things," and the 
"intricate togetherness of things." Talking this way is 
convincing as long as we understand it in causal terms. It 
is no accident that Rasmussen appeals to the discoveries of 
natural science to ground his communitarian view of nature. 
But causal interdependence, simply as such, lacks moral 
import. Rasmussen unwittingly exposes the. crucial non­
sequitur: "The goodness of life together and the reciprocity 
learned in genuine community create moral agency and 
responsibility."9 A community in which reciprocity is 
learned is indeed a moral community; but the 
mterdependence which holds it together is more than causal, 
a kind of interdependence we have been given no reason to 
apply to the cosmos. 
Aldo Leopold fell into the same error m his classic 
expression of this communitarian vision. 
All ethics so far evolved rest upon a single premise: that 
the individual is a member of a community of 
interdependent parts. His instincts prompt him to compete 
for his place in that community, but his ethics prompt him 
also to co-operate . . .  The land ethic simply enlarges the 
boundary o
f 
the community to include soils, waters, plants, 
and animals, or collectively: the land. 10 
Ethics requires the context of community and community 
requires an interdependence of cooperating members. But 
the land (in Leopold's sense) is not such a community. The 
mutuality essential to cooperation and hence to moral 
community is absent. 
Rasmussen and Leopold take a concept whose moral 
pregnancy derives from a human context and extend it 
beyond that context without supporting evidence. 
Equivocating on the word "community," they end up 
attacking a homocentric bias in ethics with a conceptual 
move which is itself deeply homocentric. Ironically, 
reconceiving the natural world in our image has become the 
basis for reconceiving ourselves in nature's image. 11 The 
result is an expanded moral vision supported by no good 
reason. Little more than mere opinion, Plato would have 
said. And he would have been right. 
THE DIFFERENCE IT MAKES 
Why should we care about having good reasons for our 
beliefs?12 Well, the likelihood of having true beliefs is 
enhanced by good reasons. That is, good reasons make it 
more likely that my beliefs reflect the way things really are 
and not merely the way I want them to be. Suppose, 
however. that we reject the very idea of "the way things 
really are"; or we say that what matters about a view of the 
cosmos is not whether it is objectively true but whether it 
supports a preferred moral vision, or that moral visions do 
not need grounding in the way things really are. 
Plato, of course, would demur on all of these suppositions. 
But assume that there is something to be said for them. 
Even then Plato would continue to defend the demand for 
good reasons since reason .lli. linked to the possibility of fl 
community of discourse. Disdain good reasons and you risk 
losing this possibility. i3 Reason fosters such a community 
because it is by nature dialectical. Provoking us to discover 
incoherence in our beliefs, it leads us to uncover the 
assumptions on which they rest and to subject these 
assumptions to critical scrutiny. In this way it pulls us 
toward the vision of a ground which can compel the assent 
of all who reach it and thus bind us together. But this 
movement has to be governed by the mutuality it seeks; 
hidden contradictions and underlying assumptions do not 
yield readily to a solitary mind. The dialectic of reason is 
of necessity dialogical. 
Here, then, is the fundamental insight: Offering reasons to 
support our beliefs and caring about the best possible 
reasons is a way of exposing ourselves to others and 
reaching out to them in the name of a community of 
discourse, a way of inviting them to join us in building this 
community. Refusing to provide reasons or to care about 
them is a rejection of community, an attempt to get others 




Each of the ideas for which I earlier claimed Platonic 
ancestry points to this final one. For me its essential 
rightness has taken a long time to sink in. Teaching for 
many years is what made it possible. Largely by 
happenstance, I stumbled into a way of teaching which 
involved taking positions in class - real positions, positions 
to which I was seriously if provisionally committed - and 
urging students to come at them with their probing 
criticism. My initial motivation was to get them thinking by 
making myself vulnerable in this way. But what I 
discovered was a dialectic in which, on the good days, we 
pushed each other into thinking in new ways and doing this 
together for the sake of · deeper understanding. I 
rediscovered Plato. 
How can there be academic community without something 
like this as the controlling ethos, in the conversations not 
only of faculty with students but among students themselves 
and even - the biggest challenge - within the faculty? How 
( even more) can it fail to be the controlling ethos at a 
college of the church, with its confession of faith in the 
creative Word and trust in a Holy Spirit moving among us? 
Here, at least, Athens and Jerusalem should meet. 
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"The Lutheran Liberal Arts College and Care for the Earth," 
by H. Paul Santmire, in Intersections (June 1997) 
Arthur A. Preisinger 
I found most of H. Paul Santmire's article, "The Lutheran 
Liberal Arts College and Care for the Earth," commendable 
and thought-provoking. The critique of the "back-to-nature" 
cult, the call for a holistic environmental ethos in the face of 
crass materialism and "sociopathic individualism," the 
suggestion of creating a cosmic liturgical praxis - all provide 
considerable food for thought and, indeed, action. 
Nevertheless, I take issue with Santmire on several counts 
relative to the section on classical Lutheran social ethics. 
Santmire admits that much of White's argument "is 
historically justified, insofar as one can allow that religious 
faith can exercise in.fact a signtficant historical causality. 
He goes on at some length to defend the ecological tradition 
in Western theology - as if Lutheran theology were 
something wholly apart from Western theology! Santmire 
encourages contemplation of the riches in the vaults of 
Western theology, advising us not to ''conclude that all 
historic Christianity has to offer is anthropocentrism and the 
domination of nature." He encourages such contemplation of 
the riches of Lutheran vaults, too. But what are these riches? 
Only one, as far as I can see: "At its best, the Lutheran 
tradition has sent forth forgiven sinners to be good citizens 
and witnesses to· the kingdom of God that has arrived in 
Jesus Christ." That is all the Lutheran tradition has to offer? 
He has damned it with faint praise. Why the bum rap for 
Lutherans? 
What is wrong here, in my op1mon, is a simplistic 
delineation of the two kingdoms ethic. Granted, the two 
kingdoms doctrine has been used by German theologians of 
this century to justify acquiescence to the Nazi regime. Did 
the regime itself use the "two kingdoms" to justify its 
actions? There is precious little evidence for that. If the two 
kingdoms really was one of the sources of Nazi mischief, it 
could only be so insofar as one can allow that religious faith 
can exercise in fact a significant historical causality. As a 
Arthur A. Preisinger is Associate Professor of 
Theology/Philosophy and History at Texas University. 
matter of fact, both A confessional and liberal German 
theologians of the nineteenth century used a distorted and 
misinterpreted two kingdoms doctrine to separate ethics 
from the gospel. 
Luther never wrote a systematic treatise on the doctrine of 
the two kingdoms. (The term itself, by the way, became 
common as late as the 1930's.) He used diverse terminology 
to come to grips with the ethical problems of the Christian of 
his day. One _needs to examine the two kinds of dualities 
(antithetical and complementary) by which he explicates the 
doctrine. Luther does make a distinction between what he 
sometimes calls the "left hand" and the "right hand" of God. 
But these are elements of the "complementary duality," i.e., 
what Ulrich Duchrow calls the two governances of God. 
True, the right distinction must be made between the two 
governances: they must not be confused. On the other hand, 
they must not be separated. The temporal (Kingdom of 
creation?) and spiritual (Kingdom of redemption?) 
governances are not spheres that can be separated, but 
dimensions to be distinguished. I will not go into the 
complexities here. I suggest a reading of Karl Hertz, ed., 
Two Kingdoms and One World: A Source book in Christian 
Ethics: Ulrich Duchrow, Two Kingdoms - The Use and 
Misuse of a Lutheran Theological Concept: and Tom 
Strieter's excellent Th.D. dissertation, "Contemporary Two 
Kingdoms and Governances Thinking to Today's World." 
If, in fact, the two kingdoms doctrine was the reason for all 
those German Lutherans jumping on the Nazi bandwagon, 
how does Santmire explain all those German Roman 
Catholics, who had no such doctrine, jumping on the same 
bandwagon? 
I do not know what Santmire means by "classical Lutheran 
teaching." Sixteenth century (Luther)? Seventeenth century? 
What? Ifhe puts the onus of intersection "only in the person 
of the individual believer. .. " on Luther, I think he is dead 
wrong. One should read, for example, Luther's commentary 
of Psalm 82, or, "On Temporal Authority: To What Extent 
It Should Be Obeyed." 
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Santmire argues that the two kingdoms is admirable for the 
theology of God's grace, but it "leaves much to be desired as 
an affirmation and defense of the theology of God's justice." 
Again, I contend it is not the two kingdoms doctrine as such 
that is to be faulted, but its abuse and misappropriation. For 
a very insightful discussion of the evolution of Luther's 
views on law and justice, I suggest F. Edward Cranz, An 
Essay on the Development of Luther's Thought on Justice, 
Law, and Society, vol. XIX of the Harvard Theological 
Series, issued as an extra number of the Harvard 
Theological Review ( 1964). 
It is ironic that Santmire brings up South Africa. The South 
African Council of Churches used the two kingdoms 
(correctly interpreted) in its fight against apartheid. I had 
discussed this very thing with Wolfram Kistner when he was 
head of the Theological Division of the Council. And 
Eberhard Bethge had lectured in South Africa on the two 
kingdoms, seeing it as a theological tool in the struggle. 
It is a real stretch to link the two kingdoms doctrine with the 
alleged non-concern of church leaders for the "groaning of 
the earth and its masses in this era of global envifonmental 
crisis." I doubt if church leaders know much, or care much, 
about the two kingdoms. The issue of whether or not to 
"hold hands with the Episcopalians," it seems to me, has 
been driven by church politics rather than by theology. If 
theology were the issue, the agreement with the 
Presbyterians, the Reformed Church and the UCC would not 
so easily have glided through the ELCA Assembly in 
August. 
Fundamental issues of social justice are being obscured in 
our time by many "circles" besides Lutherans. How do we 
know that "toxic waste dumps .. . " do not "appear" to be a 
matter of concern for "many" Lutherans today? Who are 
these "many Lutheran circles"? This is simply too general 
and too emotive to be taken seriously. 
If we are to look for skeletons in our closet, let us search for 
real bones, not plastic ones. As far as I am concerned, the 
skeletons are not so much Luther as a departure from 
Luther. As Bill Lazareth has written, "There is nothing so 
sick about Lutheran ethics that a strong dose of Luther 
cannot cure it." 
A RESPONSE TO PAUL SANTMIRE 
Don Braxton 
When asked if Lutheran theology and ethics has anything 
distinctive about it, my usual response - general but accurate 
- is that Lutheran thinking is above all else governed by a
dialectical vision. Reaching back to Paul and Augustine,
Luther's thought is thoroughly dialectical. Polarities such as
Law and Gospel, Two Kingdoms, and Freedom and
Bondage, are the driving dynamic force behind Luther's
powerful Refonnation theology. Paul Santmire's address to
Capital University delivered on November 14, 1997, clearly
embodies that tradition both in form and in content. Because
they seem so well rooted in the normative traditions of our
Lutheran liberal arts heritage, his suggestions offer the
prospect of authentic guidance for the Lutheran college
serious about its past - and its future.
Santmire's vision for the Lutheran liberal arts college in an 
environmental age is clearly dialectical. Formally, Santmire 
articulates three mandates, each of which is expounded in 
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terms of its strengths and weaknesses, or as Santmire puts it, 
"skeletons in our closets and riches in our own vaults." This 
formal mode of presentation seems to me very important, for 
it articulates a basic insight of Lutheran thought on 
institutional structures. Namely, those strengths which 
enable an institution to thrive can often lead to the same 
institutions' decay, either through complacency and even 
hubris, or through blindness. While Lutheran liberal arts 
colleges need to draw upon their historical strengths, yet they 
also need to evolve as institutions to respond to the prospects 
and dangers of a dynamic world. In effect, they need to 
identify their social functions historically and serve those 
same functions today, yet do so under quite different societal 
conditions. In other words, they must do things differently 
in order to continue to do what they have always done. 
On the content level, Santmire identifies three themes. The 
first theme is responsibility for spiritual particularity. 
Addressing a theme Santmire is uniquely qualified to assess, 
he calls for an honest owning up to the ambiguity of the 
Christian tradition toward the environment. Clearly, there 
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are skeletons in the closet of the Christian tradition on this 
account. But there are also profound resources both 
:historically and in the prolific, contemporary field of 
ecotheology and ethics. Likewise I think Santmire is on 
target when he warns against a premature flight to 
alternative religious traditions because of a putative greater 
sensitivity to the environment. I would point out that the 
historical record of the actual behaviors of these traditions 
is rarely critically assessed. At the very least, it must be 
emphasized that theoretical environmental sensitivity in 
either the Christian or the non-Christian traditions is no 
guarantee of ecologically responsible behavior in practice. 
The theme of ambiguity is carried over to comments on the 
distinctively Lutheran tradition of Two Kingdoms. Here 
again, I think Santmire is fundamentally on target. Yet 
while he is quite specific about the deficits of typical 
Lutheran social ethics, he is strangely mute on what the 
strengths might be. At issue, I think, is whether one views 
Luther's ethics as dualistic or dialectical. On the one hand, 
classical Lutheran ethics has been, and often still can be, 
very quietistic. On matters of social justice, Lutherans often 
regard the church as unqualified to enter into worldly 
political and social struggles. At the very most, it has 
sought to convert the individual conscience for higher 
standards of behavior in their secular offices. In this day 
and age, where we recognize the power of social structures 
to shape and mold character and individual behavior, such 
a stance 1s clearly inadequate. But, on the other hand, 
Lutheran ethics at its best is dialectical, recognizing the 
interpenetration of church and world, Law and Gospel, 
eschatological Kingdom and present day realities. History, 
as in St. Augustine, for example, can be regarded as 
salvation history, as the dynamic struggle for the birthing 
forth in bits and pieces of a redeemed world. While 
Lutherans will always be clear that the world is not the 
Kingdom of God - the Lutheran emphasis on sin will 
preclude that - yet they may also look for and cooperate with 
the signs of the in-breaking of God's glorious New Age, the 
New Heavens and the New Earth. Such a vision was clearly 
at the root of the Lutheran Hegel, or the Lutheran theologian 
Ritschl. Bonhoeffer and Reinhold Niebuhr certainly fit in 
this camp, as does the contemporary Lutheran ecotheologian 
Larry Rasmussen. At its best, the dialectical patterns of 
Lutheran social ethics grants us a sensitivity - hopeful yet 
realistic - to the relative approximations of ecological and 
social justice possible in our various historical moments. It 
seems to me that Santmire could have done more to point out 
these qualities. 
The other two mandates of responsible social criticism and 
the promotion of a responsible environmental ethos can be 
taken together. Clearly, the objective of the liberal arts 
tradition is to promote liberal thinkers, liberal in the classical 
sense of liberated from excessive parochialism. The 
question only remains, to what extent are Lutheran liberal 
arts colleges still doing this. Two remarks: First, my 
experience of many Lutheran colleges and universities is that 
their liberal arts dimensions have been progressively on the 
retreat in favor of more marketable vocational training in the 
areas of business, education, computer science, and the like. 
It is a matter of considerable debate as to what degree our 
graduates have managed to imbibe some of the liberal arts 
ethos, even as they have concentrated on their vocational 
choices. At least, that is often the rationale one hears for 
this institutional drift. Second, a brief glance at the 
promotional materials of our Lutheran colleges and 
universities will raise doubts as to whether Lutheran higher 
education promises to lead students deeper into the 
complexities of modem, urban life, as Santmire calls for. 
Indeed, I often have the impression that students and their 
families select private liberal arts colleges because they 
promise a safe and sheltered learning experience, not one of 
exposure. Are the products of such educational experiences 
prepared to enter our complex and wounded world equipped 
with the critical resources of a liberally educated individual? 
Finally, in my opinion, if there is an issue toward which 
contemporary liberal arts education ought to gravitate, it is 
environmental responsibility and responsible social criticism 
of ecologically unsustainable practices. Here, I believe 
Santmire places his finger on exactly the three dimensions of 
institutional reform required of contemporary institutions, 
namely, curricular reform, a pedagogy directed toward 
creative social imagination, and the practices of reverence 
and respect before life and its mysteries. Because ecology 
is the science sine qua non of interrelationships, it constitutes 
the best available option for a capstone integration 
experience. Debates have been circulating on the inclusion 
of an environmental studies component in our core 
curriculum here at Capital, yet without much success to 
date. As the world, its populations, civilizations, and 
ecosystems become increasingly interdependent, I believe 
that some form of environmental studies component in every 
educational experience will be an inevitability. A step in 
that direction would be in keeping with the creative, liberal 
thinking of our heritage, a sign that our imaginations are 
already reaching into the future, anticipating an age of 
greater ecological sanity. Until that time, liberal arts 
colleges can practice creative workshops known as 
"liturgies" where a new reality is pronounced, attended to, 
and dramatized into reality. Worship is a form of resistance 
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to the compulsions of instrumentalism and the false 
necessities in our age. Worship creates a space in which 
human potential can be unleashed, where creative 
imagination can be exercised, and where a fortitude of will 
can be developed to enter the world, in Santmire' s phrase, 
daring to be "irrelevant" to its insanity and thereby offering 
an alternative that may promise a brighter future. 
Liberal arts colleges have a tough road ahead. In the face of 
all these suggestions, many administrators and professors 
will be quick to point out that competition is stiff and that 
institutions must strike compromises. Could an institution 
like Capital really survive if it sought to embody what has 
been outlined in Santmire's article and my response? 
Indeed, in my own dialectical view, with its bent toward 
REVIEW 
realism, I am willing· to go some distance in this 
conversation. And yet, realism cuts two ways. Is it realistic 
to believe that we can continue to function in a busines-as­
usual mode in the face oflooming ecocrisis? Is it realistic to 
believe that liberal arts colleges can shove their liberal arts 
orientations to the periphery and still be liberal arts colleges 
with something distinctive to offer the educational world? Is 
it realistic to believe that we can equip students for 
responsible citizenship by training them to be articulate 
members of a global economy whose vision of a good 
society is an acre of suburban bliss, plenty of horsepower in 
the driveway, and recreational trips to Martha's Vineyard, 
Mt. Rushmore, or Club Med? So will the real realism please 
stand up? Where do you stand? 
Buford, Thomas 0. 
In Search of a Calling: The College's Role in Shaping Identity. 
Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1995 
Karla G. Bohmbach
The term "calling" has long been a favorite among Lutheran 
educators. And though its precise meaning invites debate - -
indeed, perhaps partly because of that very fact - - it 
continues to be utilized even today in efforts to formulate 
and refine what it means to be a Lutheran college or 
university. In such ongoing efforts Thomas 0. Buford's In 
Search of a CaUing: The College's Role in Shaping Identity 
would seem to be a promising participant, not least because 
it makes use of the term "calling" in its title. What, more 
precisely, does this book offer towards our thinking about 
tasks, challenges, and promises facing Lutheran colleges and 
universities as they move into the twenty-first century? 
Like others who have also been writing about higher 
education (e.g., Mark Schwehn, Page Smith, Bruce 
Wilshire), the author asserts that colleges and universities 
are in trouble. What sets Buford's work apart, though, is 
both his perspective as a philosopher and his assessment that 
the fundamental cause of this trouble is a crisis of meaning 
among students. 
Karla G. Bohmbach is Assistant Professor of Religion at 
Susquehanna University, Selinsgrove, Pa. 
One of the first tasks Buford sets for himself is determining 
the causes of this meaning-crisis; his strategy is to examine 
discussion. In the process, Buford also more specifically 
identifies and explicates what he sees as two aspects of 
the historical background in, through and against which 
American higher education has developed. Here the concept 
of"calling" is central, giving shape and focus to thecalling. 
One involves the spiritual, religious, or moral identity of a 
person (all three terms are variously used). It refers, 
fundamentally, to that which God has ordained one to do; its 
roots are in the Hebrew Bible; and it is strongly 
communitarian. The second has to do with the so-called 
practical identity of a person. This aspect is much more 
individualistic; its roots are in the Renaissance; and it 
centers on the humanists' assertion that individuals have the 
right and ability to determine their own lives, to discern their 
particular gifts, talents, and interests and then choose a life 
and career based on them. 
For Buford, both aspects of calling are necessary in order to 
achieve full personhood. The crisis facing students is that 
these two are deemed irreconcilable and so have been largely 
split asunder by the educational system. Moreover, the 
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practical aspect - - under the influence of our technological 
society - - has been given priority, with the concomitant 
neglect of the moral or theological one. Buford seeks both to 
reconnect and balance the two sides. 
In order to do so, Buford revisits the two historical traditions 
- - the biblical and the Renaissance humanist - - that,
according to him, have fundamentally shaped the
moral/theological and practical aspects of calling. His goal
is to find some common ground by which he can reconcile
the two traditions - - and the two aspects - - into some sort
of coherent whole. Thus, in looking again at the Renaissance
humanist tradition, he "corrects" for its rampant
individualism, stressing the social and cultural contexts
within which an individual's choices and decisions are made
and shaped. (His position here is actually akin to a type of
postmoderism called affirmative (Rosenau), as well as
feminist theoretical work focused on the concept of
positionality (Alcoffi ). In other words, while retaining a
degree of individualism in the Renaissance humanist
tradition, Buford balances it by also arguing for its
somewhat contingent nature.
In Buford's re-examination of the biblical tradition, he 
rethinks the meaning of imago dei, the idea that we are 
created in the image of God. Traditionally, according to 
Buford, "image of God" has meant "copy of God," with that 
which is copied being, most notably, God's rationality. For 
humans to be copies, though, implies considerable 
limitations, for it is then God, understood as the original, 
who determines human identities. Buford suggests instead 
that the imago de1 in humans be understood not as a copy, 
but rather as a representation. He further suggests that what 
is most fundamentally represented about God in humanity is 
not rationality, but rather imagination. Since imagination 
implies a certain amount of freedom, human individuality 
and a certain degree of independence is maintained. Thus, 
while retaining the biblical assertion that human identity is 
grounded in God, a certain space - - the space of the 
imagination - - is opened up for human initiative and free 
play. 
In Buford's reconstructions the humanist and biblical 
traditions come together insofar as they both allow for 
human freedom, while also both placing limits on that same 
freedom. One's calling, then, is to be worked out within the 
horizon of this tension between freedom and limitation. 
According to Buford, the task of colleges is to encourage the 
students' creative use of their imaginations, helping them to 
exercise a "new" freedom that they have in college to 
develop their own life stories (i.e., their "callings"), over 
against the stories about themselves which they have 
inherited from their parents, hometowns, friends, schools, 
and/or churches. Equally, however, it is the duty of colleges 
to support, indeed, make known, the limitations that exist for 
students as they begin to take advantage of the possibilities 
in imaginatively re-writing their stories (i.e., "finding their 
callings"). 
Buford's book is extremely beneficial in tracing out the 
broad historical contexts that inform the ideals and interests 
of the present-day system of American higher education. 
And he teases out well the complicated intertwining 
relationships of the biblical and Renaissance humanist 
traditions - - particularly their somewhat distinct 
perspectives on calling. His breadth is also impressive, for 
though his professional training is in philosophy, he also 
makes forays into such diverse fields as biblical studies (in 
an exegesis of Genesis 1-2), Christian theology (while 
considering Augustine's view of personhood), educational 
psychology (in a review of William Perry's theory of the 
developmental stages of students), and business management 
(in order to summarize and critique the reengineering system 
proposed by Michael Hammer and James Campy). What is 
both puzzling and problematic, however, is his final chapter, 
in which his practical recommendations to colleges are 
presented. 
Although he has earlier affirmed the need to work for a 
balance between freedom and limitation, his focus here is 
much more on the idea of maintaining limitations than 
enhancing freedoms. And, regarding the maintenance of 
limitations, he identifies two main interrelated obstacles that 
need to be countered: the canon and multiculturalism. His 
discussion of the canon is rather puzzling. On the one hand, 
he pleads for an open canon, because going back to the fixed 
canon of earlier generations is neither feasible nor desirable 
(p. 185). On the other hand, he is extremely wary of special­
interest groups (i.e., multiculturalists, supporters of women's 
rights), which he views as desiring to take over the canon in 
order to impose their own political agenda onto everyone 
else. The solution he offers, instead, is to refer back, and 
utilize again, the biblical and Renaissance humanist 
traditions, after both have been appropriately reconstructed 
to suit present-day needs and circumstances. (Buford is not 
forthcoming on the specifics of what this reconstruction 
might look like.) His justification for the reappropriation of 
these two traditions is that they would make the most sense 
to our students, given their backgrounds. 
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The problems here are several-fold. First, Buford caricatures 
so-called special-interest groups. Far from wishing to "take 
over," most such groups see themselves, instead, as working 
to redress an identified imbalance in the canon, wherein its 
interests, concerns, and viewpoints are weighted towards a 
relatively narrow band of persons (i.e., white, male, 
educated, middle-to upper-class, heterosexual). Second, even 
though he admits that the ideals of the Bible and the 
Renaissance are no better or worse than those of any other 
traditions, his appeal to them as the best option ( even if they 
are reconstructed), leads one to suspect - - whatever his 
disclaimers - - that he desires a return to an earlier, 
narrowly-defined, and fixed canon. 
The most serious problem, though, seems to be his argument 
that these two traditions are to be preferred because they 
would be the most familiar, and thus the easiest, for 
students. Regarding their familiarity, Buford· consistently 
operates with the notion that every student on campus is 
equally invested in and/or sympathetic to - - not to say 
knowledgeable of - - the ideals of the Bible and the 
Renaissance. He simply assumes the existence of a 
homogeneous student body, one in which all students have 
the same backgrounds and share equally in the same 
historical/cultural contexts. But that has never been quite the 
reality in American colleges, whatever the "myth" has been, 
and is even less so today. 
But even if college students are most familiar with the 
Renaissance and biblical traditions, should we as educators 
necessarily just accommodate ourselves to their familiarity? 
Easy is not always the best. One of the reasons Buford gives 
for concentrating on the Biblical and Renaissance traditions 
centers on the limited nature of a college's resources. "To 
expect an American college to teach every culture and 
language that students demand, as if those students will live 
out their calling in those cultures, is beyond the capability of 
the college ... " (p.190). I am not gainsaying the challenge 
facing colleges in educating our students in a way that 
informs them and fosters in them an appreciation of the 
multiple cultures of the world in which they live. It is a task 
that requires all the imagination and effort we can possible 
marshal. It is, nevertheless, necessary. Our world is 
becoming ever smaller; the interconnections across political 
and social boundaries are becoming increasingly numerous 
and marked. Despite Buford's disclaimer, it is, in fact, highly 
likely that a significant number of our students will live out 
their callings in a culture far different from the one in which 
they were raised! 
We, as educators, need to think harder, and even more 
imaginatively than Buford advocates, in order to see our way 
to an education for our students that will satisfy the demands 
of the 215' century. 
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